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The Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity 
Gregory M. Gilchrist* 
Is it possible to justify imposing criminal liability on corporations? Two basic aspects of 
criminal law have no application to corporations: Corporations cannot be jailed and they 
cannot form mental states. Moreover, there is reason to think that much of the deterrent 
effect generated by corporate criminal liability could be generated more efficiently by civil 
liability. Still, the demand for criminal prosecution of corporations remains high. This 
Article seeks to understand why we have corporate criminal liability, and it concludes that 
expressivism is necessary to justify the practice. Expressivism justifies punishment by 
reference to the benefits of a statement of moral condemnation. With regard to 
corporations, however, the power of expressivism is strongest in the absence of liability. 
While there may be some expressive benefit to holding corporations criminally liable, the 
expressive cost of excluding corporations from criminal law altogether is the real driving 
force in justifying corporate criminal liability: Immunity presents a materially harmful 
expression. This expressive cost of immunity justifies holding corporations criminally 
liable. Of course, just because it is possible to justify corporate criminal liability by 
reference to the expressive cost of immunity, it does not necessarily follow that the current 
practice of prosecuting corporations serves this end well. There are reasons to think it 
does not, but the relationship between expressivism and corporate criminal liability 
suggests a fruitful path toward reimagining how and when corporations ought to be 
subject to criminal liability. The path to reform will be the subject of a subsequent article; 
this Article lays the theoretical groundwork for reform. 
 
 *  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Toledo. A.B., Stanford; J.D., Columbia. I am 
grateful for comments, insights, and guidance from Jelani Exum, Howard Friedman, Susan Martyn, 
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Introduction 
It might also be added that corporations have no consciences, no 
beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires. Corporations help 
structure and facilitate the activities of human beings, to be sure, and 
their “personhood” often serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are 
not themselves members of “We the People” by whom and for whom 
our Constitution was established. 
—Justice John Paul Stevens1 
After the Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded, burned and sank in 
the Gulf of Mexico, Americans watched 60,000 barrels of oil spill into the 
gulf each day.2 The spill, forty-nine miles off the coast of Louisiana, 
continued unabated for three months.3 It hurt people,4 animals,5 
industries,6 and ecosystems.7 The total costs of the spill are still not 
known.8 The causes, however, are: “[The] blowout can be traced to a 
series of identifiable mistakes made by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean 
that reveal such systematic failures in risk management that they place in 
doubt the safety culture of the entire industry.”9 
The BP Gulf disaster is but a single—if exceptional in scale—
instance of harmful corporate conduct.10 Corporations are ubiquitous in 
 
 1. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 972 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 2. See Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, Deep 
Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling 146 (2011). 
 3. See id. at vi, viii. 
 4. See id. at 191–95. 
 5. See id. at 181–83. 
 6. See id. at 185–91. 
 7. See id. at 174–81. 
 8. See id. at vi (“The costs from this one industrial accident are not yet fully counted, but it is 
already clear that the impacts on the region’s natural systems and people were enormous, and that 
economic losses total tens of billions of dollars.”). 
 9. Id. at vii. 
 10. Notably, BP had a prior felony conviction for a violation of the Clean Air Act. The charge 
arose from a 2005 explosion at a Texas refinery that killed fifteen people and injured at least 170 
others. BP negotiated an 11(c)(1)(C) agreement pursuant to which the corporation pled guilty to a 
single count and agreed to pay a $50 million fine and serve three years probation. The victims opposed 
the plea, arguing the penalty was insufficient. The court ruled in favor of BP and accepted the plea. 
See United States v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 655 (S.D. Tex. 2009). 
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our society,11 and they serve valuable functions. It is all but impossible to 
imagine an economy as vibrant and powerful as the one we enjoy without 
the corporate form. Corporations are powerful legal tools that facilitate 
the aggregation of capital, the reduction of transaction costs, continuity 
of enterprise, and institutionalization of values such as teamwork. We 
would have a very different economy—and very different lives—without 
corporations. But it remains a fact that, notwithstanding the obvious 
benefits, corporations can and do cause harm. 
When corporations cause harm, should the corporation itself be 
held legally responsible, and if so, how? Should corporations be held 
criminally liable for certain acts of their agents, or is some combination 
of civil liability for the corporation and criminal liability for individual 
wrongdoers sufficient? The present state of the law is clear. When a 
corporation causes harm, it may be held civilly liable.12 When a 
corporation violates criminal laws, it may be held criminally liable.13 
This was not always so. The doctrine of corporate criminal liability 
is a little over a century old.14 Historically, corporations were immune to 
criminal liability.15 There are two obvious reasons not to apply criminal 
law to corporations. First, criminal law is built around the concept of 
mens rea, “a guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful purpose; a criminal 
intent.”16 By most measures, corporations lack minds, purposes, and 
intents,17 and therefore the criminal law would seem not to apply. 
Second, criminal law has traditionally been distinguished by resort to 
 
 11. In 1909, the Supreme Court wrote that the law “cannot shut its eyes to the fact that the great 
majority of business transactions in modern times are conducted through [corporations], and 
particularly that interstate commerce is almost entirely in their hands . . . .” N.Y. Cent. & Hudson 
River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909). The role of corporations in society and 
commerce has only increased in the last century. 
 12. See id. at 493 (“It is now well established that in actions for tort the corporation may be held 
responsible for the acts of its agent within the scope of his employment.”) (citing Lake Shore & Mich. 
S. R.R. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 109, 111 (1893)). 
 13. See id. at 495 (holding that corporations may be held criminally liable for the acts of an 
agent). 
 14. See generally id. New York Central was not the first case to hold a corporation criminally 
liable, see, e.g., United States v. Van Schaick, 134 F. 592 (1904) (holding a corporation criminally liable 
after a steamship accident), but it is the case most commonly associated with the doctrine of corporate 
criminal liability. 
 15. See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries 464 (“A corporation cannot commit treason, or 
felony, or other crime, in it[]s corporate capacity; though it[]s other members may, in their distinct 
individual capacities.”). 
 16. United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 489 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (quoting Black’s 
Law Dictionary 1137 (4th ed. 1968)). 
 17. The language we use to describe corporate conduct is explored below. See infra Part II.A. 
There may be value to describing a corporation’s purpose, or even intent. However, this is a linguistic 
shortcut to describe a more complex state of affairs. See infra note 103 and accompanying text. 
Fundamentally, we mean something different when we talk about the intent, purpose, or knowledge of 
a corporation than when we talk about that of a natural person. 
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corporal punishment and deprivation of liberty. Since corporations 
cannot be beaten or jailed, this distinctive function of criminal law is 
unnecessary.18 For both reasons, it is not obvious that criminal law should 
apply to corporations—and for a long time corporations were immune to 
criminal prosecution—but for the last hundred years this has not been 
the case.19 
Clarity of the law aside, there is little agreement about whether the 
law is correct. The practice of holding corporations criminally liable is 
variously treated as a sort of judicial mistake that never got cleaned up,20 
as the senseless and puerile reaction of an ignorant public,21 or as an 
inefficient relic best replaced by a civil scheme.22 Yet the practice persists. 
This Article maintains that criminal liability for corporations23 exists 
for good reason. The practice can benefit society and the legal system. 
Whether criminal liability does so depends on how it is imposed. The 
present practice of criminal regulation of corporations is in some 
disarray.24 Many have called for significant changes to the practice of 
 
 18. See Blackstone, supra note 15, at 464 (“Neither is [a corporation] capable of suffering a 
traitor’s or felon’s punishment, for it is not liable to corporal penalties . . . .”). 
 19. See N.Y. Cent., 212 U.S. at 499 (holding a corporation criminally liable for the act of its agent). 
 20. See Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 
75 Minn. L. Rev. 1095, 1114 (1991) [hereinafter Bucy, Corporate Ethos] (“The Court’s reasoning in 
New York Central contains three major flaws that other courts have exacerbated over time.”); Pamela 
H. Bucy, Organizational Sentencing Guidelines: The Cart Before the Horse, 71 Wash. U. L.Q. 329, 
339–40 (1993) (“Not only is New York Central the premier decision establishing criminal liability for 
corporations in American law, but its flawed and outdated reasoning exemplifies subsequent courts’ 
analysis of corporate criminal liability.” (citation omitted)); see also Gerhard Muller, Mens Rea and the 
Corporation, 19 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 21, 21 (1957) (comparing the doctrine of corporate criminal liability to 
a weed: “Nobody bred it, nobody cultivated it, nobody planted it. It just grew.”). 
 21. See, e.g., Al Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 1359, 1373 (2009) (comparing imposing criminal liability on a corporation to smashing a 
computer in frustration: “therapeutic, but it is not recommended for children or for grownups”). 
 22. See, e.g., Vikramaditya Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 
109 Harv. L. Rev. 1477 (1996). 
 23. Throughout this Article I generally use the term “corporation,” rather than the broader terms 
organization, group, and entity. The arguments for the most part apply to the broader category; thus, I 
would conclude that not only can there be a valid purpose for holding corporations criminally liable, 
so too there can there be a valid purpose to holding labor unions, churches, and charitable 
organizations criminally liable, regardless of the precise corporate form. I concentrate on corporations 
for two reasons: First, I am primarily interested in how our criminal justice system handles violation of 
laws by corporations; second, much of the literature also refers to corporations. I hope using the same 
language improves readability. 
 24. Criticism of the way corporations are currently prosecuted is widespread. Groups as diverse 
as the Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers have joined 
voices in criticism. See Brief for the Ass’n of Corporate Counsel et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Appellant Urging Reversal, United States v. Ionia, 555 F.3d 303 (2008) (No. 07-5081) (urging the 
Second Circuit to limit the principle of respondeat superior in determining corporate criminal 
liability). This Article examines the proper purpose of corporate criminal liability. A better practice of 
corporate criminal liability—reexamined in light of the purpose developed herein—is the subject of 
Gregory M. Gilchrist, Condemnation Without Basis: An Expressive Failure of Corporate Prosecutions, 
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imposing criminal liability on corporations.25 These calls are compelling 
but arguably premature: There is too little consensus regarding the 
justification for imposing criminal liability on corporations. Before we 
can fix this aspect of our legal system, we ought to understand its 
purpose. We must agree on whether and why corporations ought to be 
held criminally liable. This Article clarifies the rationale for corporate 
criminal liability. 
Criminal liability for corporations exists in large part to deter 
undesirable corporate conduct and to encourage desirable corporate 
practices, but carrots and sticks are not sufficient justification for the 
imposition of criminal liability on corporations. In theory, civil liability 
for corporations could distribute carrots and sticks as effectively and 
more efficiently. 
Deterrence, however, is not the only function of criminal liability. 
Were corporations accountable only civilly, they would be immune from 
criminal prosecution. That immunity has a cost, not in lost deterrent 
effect, but rather in expressive effect. Criminal liability carries “a formal 
and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the 
community.”26 For this reason, we do not think of criminal penalties as 
mere prices one may elect to pay in exchange for violating the law. We 
would not describe a murder statute as establishing a rule that you may 
intentionally and unlawfully cause the death of another person if you are 
willing to be incarcerated for a span of years. The murderer is both 
incarcerated and condemned. Substantive criminal law does more than 
correlate conduct with consequences: It sets forth prohibitions. Violation 
of the criminal law is accompanied by opprobrium, and while the degree 
of condemnation varies between substantive criminal laws, the fact of 
condemnation is a fairly consistent aspect of criminal liability. 
Expressivists contend that this expression has a value—apart from any 
deterrent effect—that can help justify the imposition of punishment.27 
This Article argues that only deterrence and expressivism together 
can justify imposing criminal liability on corporations. Others have 
suggested that corporate criminal liability has an expressive value,28 but 
 
64 Hastings L.J. (forthcoming 2013). 
 25. See, e.g., Andrew Weissman & Alixandra Smith, U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, 
Restoring Balance: Proposed Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 11 (2010) 
(urging implementation of a compliance defense to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78dd–781); Ellen S. Podgor, A New Corporate World Mandates a “Good Faith” Affirmative 
Defense, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1537 (2007); Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the New 
Regulators: Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 159 (2008). 
 26. Henry M. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Probs. 401, 405 (1958). 
 27. See generally Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility 
98 (1970). 
 28. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. Legal 
Stud. 609, 622 (1998) (“Deterring inefficient conduct is one socially desired objective, but repudiating 
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this Article reaches two novel conclusions. First, the most significant 
expressive value associated with corporate criminal liability is the 
expressive cost of immunizing corporations. People blame corporations 
for harmful conduct, and there is a significant symbolic or expressive cost 
to never subjecting corporations to criminal liability. Immunizing 
corporations from prosecution would present its own symbolism: 
Namely, corporations may violate criminal laws if they are willing to pay 
for it. Corporate crime would thus be little more than a menu of harms 
and prices. This result is contrary to strongly held societal norms (that is, 
for the most part, people do not believe corporations should be able to 
commit crimes so long as they are willing to pay for it) and a legal system 
that adopted this perspective would do so at a cost to its own legitimacy. 
The costs and benefits of legal rules to legitimacy can be illustrated 
through a corollary to H.L.A. Hart’s internal aspect of rules,29 or through 
Tom Tyler’s thesis on procedural fairness.30 This Article considers both 
approaches and concludes that in either assessment, immunity for 
corporations comes at a significant cost in terms of the legitimacy of the 
legal system. 
This Article’s second conclusion is that expressivism is particularly 
justified toward corporations in a way it could not be toward natural 
persons. Expressivism is generally a thin reed against which to balance 
the imposition of criminal liability. Punishment is the intentional 
infliction of harm on another, and to justify such a serious violation of 
individual liberty one ought to have a better justification than the 
vaguely defined benefits of an ephemeral expression. But this balance 
can be justified for corporations in a way that is not applicable to natural 
persons, based on the differences between the capacities of natural 
persons and those of corporations. 
Calls for the reform of corporate prosecutions are right.31 The 
system of holding corporations accountable for wrongdoing is not 
functioning well and could function better. Recognizing the relationship 
between expressivism and corporate criminal liability will be useful in 
identifying what reforms are really needed. A forthcoming paper will 
propose reform in light of the expressive function of corporate criminal 
liability.32 
 
the false valuations embodied in corporate wrongdoing is another.”); see also Samuel W. Buell, The 
Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 Ind. L.J. 473 (2006); Lawrence Friedman, In Defense 
of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 833 (2000). 
 29. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 56–57 (2d ed. 1994). 
 30. See Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (2006). 
 31. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 32.  See Gregory M. Gilchrist, Condemnation Without Basis: An Expressive Failure of Corporate 
Prosecutions, 64 Hastings L.J. (forthcoming 2013). 
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Part I of this Article begins by exploring the fact and function of 
corporate culture. Different corporations exhibit different cultures, and 
these cultures exercise influence over individual corporate agents. Good 
corporate cultures can prevent some wrongdoing, and bad corporate 
cultures can encourage or at least fail to discourage some wrongdoing. 
Our willingness to judge corporations and the reasonableness of our 
judgments is closely tied to the existence of corporate cultures. 
Part II considers three critical objections to imposing criminal 
liability on corporations. Part II.A considers the first objection, which is 
ontologically reductionist: A corporation is no more than the sum of its 
parts, and any description of “corporate action” is better described solely 
by reference to individuals. There is not significant support for this view 
in legal circles, and it does not pose a significant challenge to criminal 
liability for corporations; however, it is worth brief consideration because 
doing so illustrates the significance of corporate culture. 
Part II.B considers a second objection rising from the natural law 
tradition. Michael S. Moore suggests that the concept of responsibility is 
simply too human to be applied to corporations.33 This Subpart explores 
the relevance of personhood and capacity in assessing moral blame. 
Relying on positivist legal theory, it concludes that personhood is not 
really the issue, capacity is. Certain capacities are necessary for the 
assessment of moral blame, and corporations lack these capacities. 
Lacking capacities necessary for moral blame, corporations are not 
properly subject to retribution. 
Since corporate criminal liability cannot be justified retributively, it 
must be justified—if at all—consequentially. The consequentialist 
justification for criminal liability is most prominently associated with 
deterrence. Part II.C considers the third objection to corporate criminal 
liability: Vikramaditya Khanna argues that the deterrent benefits of 
criminal liability for corporations could be secured more efficiently 
through civil liability.34 This account is a significant challenge to the 
practice of imposing criminal liability on corporations because if criminal 
liability for corporations accomplishes nothing more than civil liability 
could—and it does it at greater cost—it cannot be justified on purely 
consequentialist grounds. While this efficiency challenge is compelling, it 
is ultimately unsatisfying for its failure to pay sufficient attention to the 
stigma of a criminal conviction and the value of expression in the legal 
system. 
 
 33. See Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal Law 618 (1997) 
(speculating on the possible need to add the requirement of “embodiment in a human body” to the 
attributes of “persons” necessary for moral agency). 
 34. See generally Khanna, supra note 22. 
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Part III turns to stigma and expressivism as a justification for 
imposing criminal liability on corporations. Part III.A identifies the 
expression of condemnation as the feature that most clearly distinguishes 
criminal from civil liability, and it grounds this expression as a corollary 
to Hart’s internal aspect of rules. Part III.B illustrates why the expressive 
aspect of criminal liability, although real, ought not to be valued for its 
own sake. Part III.C identifies the consequential benefit of the expressive 
aspect of corporate criminal liability as well as the consequential cost of 
the expressive aspect of corporate criminal immunity. This Part turns 
again to Hart’s internal aspect of rules, as well as Tyler’s procedural 
fairness, to illustrate that the most powerful—and negative—expression 
regarding corporate criminal liability would be eliminating criminal 
liability altogether. Finally, Part III.D acknowledges reasons to be 
skeptical about expressive justifications for punishment while arguing 
that these reasons apply less to corporations than to natural persons. 
This Article concludes by suggesting that the practice of corporate 
prosecutions must be reexamined in light of the expressive aspect of 
corporate criminal liability. 
I.  Corporate Cultures and Corporate Responsibility 
Why do people blame corporations? A corporation is an inanimate 
legal fiction.35 Blaming an inanimate legal fiction might appear senseless 
or silly. It need be neither. Where the corporation itself created an 
atmosphere conducive to the harmful or wrongful conduct, we can 
meaningfully blame the corporation.36 
Corporations have cultures, and corporate cultures influence the 
conduct of corporate agents. Distinctions between these very real aspects 
of corporations can give rise to judgments about the relative value of 
different corporations. In extreme cases, such judgments can ground 
legitimate condemnation or praise. 
Corporations only act through the individual actions of natural 
persons; however, those natural persons act within—and sometimes on 
account of—a corporate culture. The culture or ethos of a corporation 
varies between corporations.37 There is significant empirical support for 
 
 35. Justice Marshall described a corporation as “an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and 
existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those 
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it either expressly or as incidental to its very 
existence.” Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 5 U.S. 518, 636 (1819). 
 36. The virtue and psychology of blaming are beyond the scope of this Article. For a fascinating 
treatment of both, see Moore, supra note 33, at 138–52. For purposes of this Article, it is sufficient that 
there is a way in which blaming a corporation is more meaningful than blaming a banana peel on 
which you slip. This Part (along with sections of the following Parts) describes why it can make more 
sense to blame a corporation than a banana peel. 
 37. Bucy, Corporate Ethos, supra note 20, at 1123–24 (“Much of the voluminous business 
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the proposition that “management’s commitment to corporate ethics, 
organizational culture, and institutional incentive structure . . . have been 
determined to significantly influence the level of organizational 
misconduct.”38 Institutions influence people.39 This influence can be positive 
and it can be negative. 
Where the cultural influence of a corporation is positive—as it 
frequently is—individuals affiliated with an organization can accomplish 
more good collectively than they could individually. Ian Lee captures 
positive aspects of corporate culture by considering corporations as 
teams.40 A team is distinguished by two factors: “group identification and 
the consequent adoption of collectively rational principles by the 
members of the team.”41 Individuals who act on behalf of an organization 
do not do so purely in accord with their own preferences.42 If they did, 
they could be expected only to put forth the minimum effort to receive 
compensation or avoid penalties, and this is not a model for corporate 
success.43 Rather, “[s]uccessful production requires . . . that the 
participants . . . identify as the members of a team and that they regard 
doing their part towards the collective goals of the team as a principle of 
action.”44 By identifying corporate actors as team members, Lee suggests a 
justification for penalizing the corporation as a whole for the failure of 
individual team members.45 
Where the cultural influence of a corporation is negative, 
individuals may participate in wrongful or harmful actions in which they 
would not participate absent the collective.46 Psychological and 
 
literature on corporate culture is premised on the notion that organizations have distinctive 
cultures.”); id. at 1128 (envisioning a system of corporate criminal liability predicated on “proof of a 
corporate ethos that encourages criminal conduct”). 
 38. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 
81 Wash. U. L.Q. 487, 493 n.16 (2003).  
 39. See Buell, supra note 28, at 491 (“Institutions influence people in ways that sometimes make it 
rational to blame institutions for what people do.”). 
 40. Ian B. Lee, Corporate Criminal Responsibility as Team Member Responsibility, 31 Oxford J. 
Legal Stud. 755, 772 (2011) (“Collectivities are not quasi-persons, but teams.”). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 768 (“Teamwork, I would suggest, is a context in which individual behaviour is not 
driven solely by utility maximization.”). 
 43. Id. at 769 (“[O]ne normally wants team members to devote more than the bare minimum of 
effort that will prevent their incurring contractual penalties or dismissal from the team.”). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 779 (“[P]unishment should take the form of a setback to the team’s goals rather than the 
infliction of direct harm upon the members.”). 
 46. Cognitive biases “result in behavior that systematically departs from that predicted by the 
traditional rational choice model.” Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in 
Corporate Governance, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 27 (2002). In a group setting these systematic biases can 
result in high numbers of deviations from the rational choice model. Id. at 27–30 (describing herding 
and overconfidence as two examples). Moreover, group decisionmaking has been shown to be subject 
to its own biases. See Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink 9 (1972) (“‘[G]roupthink’ . . . [is] a mode 
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sociological studies support the claim that institutions allow individuals 
to commit wrongs they otherwise would not commit.47 Reasons for this 
include: a diffusion of responsibility,48 a contagion effect whereby the 
concordant acts of others insulate one’s own acts from critical 
reflection;49 and a rationalization to avoid signaling concern to others.50 
This really is the key point: Corporations employ natural persons, 
and those natural persons act in various ways to serve the goals of the 
corporation. The corporation in turn creates various incentives to 
motivate these natural persons to act in certain ways through these 
incentives and through some uniformity of communication, establishes a 
culture,51 and that culture can cause the natural persons employed by the 
corporation to act in ways they would not act were they not in a group 
setting—were they not in that culture.52 
Massey Energy provides a stark example of company culture 
directly contributing to the death of twenty-nine men. On April 5, 2010, 
“a powerful explosion tore through the Upper Big Branch mine, owned 
by Massey Energy.”53 The explosion killed twenty-nine miners and left 
one seriously injured.54 A spark from a mining tool ignited a pocket of 
methane, and the methane ignited coal dust.55 The resultant explosion 
traveled through more than two miles of mine.56 An independent 
commission conducted extensive analysis and investigation before 
concluding that the explosion was caused by extensive safety violations 
and was “a completely predictable result for a company that ignored 
 
of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the 
members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses 
of action.”). People behave differently in groups. 
 47. Buell, supra note 28, at 493–97.  
 48. Id. John Darley points to the diffusion of information and the diffusion and fragmentation of 
responsibility as aspects of organizations that cause ordinary people to participate in harmful actions. 
See John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize Individuals into Evildoing, in Codes of Conduct 16 
(David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996). 
 49. Buell, supra note 28. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Bucy, Corporate Ethos, supra note 20, at 1123 (“Today, the term [ethos] refers to the 
characteristic spirit or prevalent tone of sentiment of a community, institution or system.”). 
 52. Eli Lederman observes that, if this is the basis of holding corporations liable, then “it is not 
necessarily claimed that the accused is the perpetrator of the illegal act or omission but, rather, that it 
is the entity that is responsible for creating the conditions and the environment that engendered the 
offense, and hence its liability.” Eli Lederman, Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: 
from Adaptation and Imitation to Aggregation and the Search for Self-Identity, 4 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 
641, 707 (2000). I agree with Lederman in this; in most cases where people blame a corporation, they 
are not suggesting the corporation “committed” the crime directly; a natural person did that. They are 
suggesting that the corporation somehow influenced the natural person or persons to act. 
 53. See Governor’s Indep. Investigation Panel, Upper Big Branch 4 (2011) [hereinafter Upper 
Big Branch Report]. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 16. 
 56. Id. 
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basic safety standards and put too much faith in its own mythology.”57 
The safety lapses were so extensive that the commission concludes they 
could “only be explained in the context of a culture in which wrongdoing 
became acceptable, where deviation became the norm.”58 Relying on 
Diane Vaughan’s study of the Challenger disaster,59 the commission 
described the “[n]ormalization of deviance” as “a gradual process 
through which unacceptable practices or standards become acceptable.”60 
“As the deviant behavior is repeated without catastrophic results, it 
becomes the social norm for the organization.”61 Methane gas, coal dust, 
and a spark caused the explosion, but the culture of Massey Energy 
caused the presence of methane gas, coal dust, and a spark. 
It makes sense, therefore, that we judge different companies 
differently. A company’s culture is its character, and that character 
influences its actions, good and bad.62 By way of example, consider two 
hypothetical corporations: Corporation Alpha has a strong culture of 
compliance with U.S. law; Corporation Beta does not. 
Corporation Alpha’s culture is reflected in part through extensive 
efforts to educate executives, managers, and sales personnel about the 
requirements of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”).63 Alpha 
requires personnel to attend training not only as to the requirements and 
restrictions imposed by the FCPA, but also addressing the reasons for 
restricting payments to foreign government officials. Using materials 
from Transparency International64 and the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development,65 Corporation Alpha educates its 
employees about the impact of corruption on both foreign populations 
and the rule of law. By demonstrating that even small bribes can 
generate a culture of corruption in a nation, Corporation Alpha argues 
 
 57. Id. at 108. 
 58. Id. at 101. 
 59. Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and 
Deviance at NASA (1996). 
 60. See Upper Big Branch Report, supra note 52, at 97. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Bucy sees functional similarities between corporate culture in criminal prosecutions of 
corporations and intent in criminal prosecution of natural persons. See Bucy, Corporate Ethos, supra 
note 20, at 1114 (“In the context of a fictional entity, [corporate ethos] translates into intention.”). 
While there may be functional similarities in Bucy’s proposal, ethos in the corporate context is more 
akin to a natural person’s character than it is to her intention. A corporation’s culture or ethos is not 
act-specific, unlike a natural person’s intent. Rather, and more like a natural person’s character, the 
corporate culture exercises some non-specific, but nonetheless real, influence over specific decisions. 
 63. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd–781 (1998). 
 64. See, e.g., Corruption Perceptions Index 2011, Transparency International (2011), http:// 
cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/#CountryResults. 
 65. See generally OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. 105-43 (1998); see also OECD 
Publ’g, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011). 
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that the people of the nation are hurt (to the extent they are deprived of 
the legitimate distribution of government services), and eventually the 
nation itself is hurt. A corrupt nation is not the sort of place Corporation 
Alpha can effectively do business. Bribes beget bribes, and the rule of 
law falters. Corporation Alpha might, in a single instance, be able to 
benefit from a bribe, but over the long-term bribes undermine the very 
viability of its place of business.66 Corporation Alpha makes more money 
in Germany67 than Somalia.68 Corruption is not the sole reason for this, 
but it is a factor. Corporation Alpha is committed to compliance with the 
FCPA. 
Corporation Beta has no comparable program. To the contrary, 
Corporation Beta has a history of compensating country managers based 
solely on sales volume. There is no distinction or allowance made for the 
different cultures and regulatory systems of different nations in which it 
does business. An employee who is assigned to manage business in a 
highly corrupt country is given no guidance other than that which all 
other employees receive: Sell and get paid.69 The failure to even 
acknowledge or address the variable conditions between different 
countries creates a culture in which personnel who wish to succeed are 
rewarded for mirroring the culture in which they operate. If this means 
paying bribes, they will pay bribes. 
The problem is that a violation of the FCPA can happen at 
Corporation Alpha just as it can happen at Corporation Beta.70 
 
 66. Businesses have been promoting such broad training for some time, and with some success. A 
2007 survey of senior corporate executives conducted by the Economist Intelligence Unit found over 
65% of respondents “believe a level playing field is crucial to their company’s future business 
activities.” See PricewaterhouseCoopers, Confronting Corruption: The Business Case for an 
Effective Anti-Corruption Programme 2, 36 (2008). 
 67. Ranked 14th out of 182 countries listed on Transparency International’s 2011 Corruption 
Perception Index. See Corruption Perceptions Index 2011, supra note 64. 
 68. Ranked 182nd (tied) of 182 countries listed on Transparency International’s 2011 Corruption 
Perception Index. Id. 
 69. These concrete distinctions between Alpha and Beta in the isolated context of foreign 
corruption are components of what, at some higher level of abstraction, would be considered 
corporate culture. See supra text accompanying notes 37–38. For a fascinating summary of literature 
examining distinctions in corporate cultures, see Bucy, Corporate Ethos, supra note 20, at 1123–27. 
 70. This does happen. Compliance programs are helpful, but they are not guarantees against 
wrongdoing. In 2011, Johnson & Johnson (“J&J”) entered a Deferred Prosecution Agreement with the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) resolving an investigation of payments in violation of the FCPA. See 
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice and Johnson & Johnson (Apr. 8, 2011). In 
resolving the matter, the DOJ stipulated that: “J&J had a pre-existing compliance and ethics program 
that was effective and the majority of problematic operations globally resulted from insufficient 
implementation of the J&J compliance and ethics program in acquired companies.” Id. ¶ 4.k.v. Note 
that, although some of the violations for which J&J was held accountable (through the Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement) resulted from insufficient implementation of its compliance and ethics 
program in newly acquired companies, others did not. For those other violations, J&J had what the 
DOJ determined to be “a pre-existing compliance and ethics program that was effective.” Id. An 
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Corporation Alpha’s culture and program should be helpful to 
discourage and to avoid violations, but they cannot guarantee that no 
employee ever will decide to pay a bribe for the benefit of the 
corporation. Now assume this occurs: An employee at Corporation 
Alpha pays a bribe. An employee at Corporation Beta pays an identical 
bribe in identical circumstances. Under the above hypothetical, 
Corporation Alpha is in some sense less culpable than Corporation Beta 
for the criminal conduct of its employee.71 
So we can make judgments between corporate cultures. Whether 
these judgments are appropriately categorized as moral or merely 
preferential is not particularly important.72 And it should be noted that, 
even if these judgments are merely preferences as opposed to moral 
truths, that does not mean they are somehow weak or fickle.73 The 
important fact is that we favor Corporation Alpha’s conduct and disfavor 
Corporation Beta’s conduct.74 
 
effective program merely reduces non-compliance. 
 71. Notably, it is even possible that Corporation Alpha would be less culpable than Corporation 
Beta in a scenario where a Corporation Alpha employee paid a bribe and no Corporation Beta 
employee paid one. Since the culpability of a corporation stems from how we value the corporation’s 
influence over its agents, an argument could be made for a less result-driven imposition of 
punishment. I do not favor result-independent punishment for corporations, because ex ante 
prescriptions are less likely to minimize corporate wrongdoing than criminal liability predicated on the 
principle of respondeat superior. I touch on this idea further below, see infra note 174, but complete 
exploration of this idea is beyond the scope of this Article.  
 72. Or, at least for purposes of this Article, the distinction is not important. The distinction 
between morality and preference is well beyond the scope of this Article. This Article considers the 
purpose of punishing corporations criminally and concludes, in part, that there is an instrumental 
reason to do so. Whether we judge certain corporate conduct morally superior or merely preferred, 
the instrumental function of criminal liability for corporations is to increase favored (morally or 
otherwise) conduct and decrease disfavored conduct. To maintain that the condemnation of a 
corporation for harm it caused is moral as opposed to merely a question of preference, then one would 
need to respond to Moore’s concerns about capacity, which seem to me compelling. See infra text 
accompanying notes 96–108. Philip Pettit has proposed a model to do so, identifying rational 
autonomy in group entities. See Philip Pettit, Responsibility Incorporated, 117 Ethics 171, 178–79 
(2007) (arguing that group entities are capable of forming “a robust pattern of attitudinal and 
behavioral rationality”). 
 73. See Jeremy Waldron, The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity, in Natural Law Theory 169 
(Robert P. George ed., 1992) (“[M]any deep emotions . . . are strong, steady, and remarkably resistant 
to both deliberate change and the vicissitudes of circumstance. Think, for example, of parental love 
and concern.”). 
 74. So too, sharks that attack people are (generally) disfavored; sharks that do not attack people 
are favored. Apple trees that produce fewer apples (all else being equal) are disfavored; those that 
produce more apples are favored. If laws could influence sharks or trees (even indirectly, say, by 
influencing fishermen or farmers), then a law might aim to encourage that which is favored. Such 
application of law to influence things other than natural persons is entirely uncontroversial. The 
controversy surrounding criminal liability for corporations stems from the application of what is often 
viewed as a uniquely moral area of law (criminal law) to an inanimate entity. The remainder of this 
Article tackles this problem. 
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II.  Three Challenges to Holding Corporations 
Criminally Liable 
In this Part, I consider three challenges to the imposition of criminal 
liability on corporations. Each challenge is eventually rejected; however, 
each challenge also illustrates an aspect of corporations necessary to the 
expressive justification for corporate criminal liability. 
The first challenge is reductionist: Corporations are no more than 
the sum of their parts; corporate action is best described by reference 
solely to individual actions; liability ought to attach only to individual 
actions.75 The second challenge concerns personhood and capacity: 
Corporations lack certain capacities that natural persons have; these 
capacities are necessary for moral desert; corporations cannot be subject 
to moral blame.76 The third challenge recognizes the value of punishing 
corporations, but questions whether criminal law is the appropriate 
instrument for that purpose; it suggests civil law will generally be a more 
efficient legal instrument for deterrence purposes.77  
A. Contrary to the Individualist Account, Corporations Do Act 
The most fundamental objection to imposing criminal liability on 
corporations is that the very idea makes no sense: It is absurd to speak of 
assigning any form of responsibility to a corporation.78 “Individualists” 
maintain that, because a corporation is a legal fiction referring to a 
collection of persons and agreements, the actions of a corporation only 
can be described by exclusive reference to individual actions.79 
Accordingly, the individualist is skeptical about the possibility of 
assigning responsibility to a corporation.80 
Indeed, according to the individualist, something may be lost in 
terms of accuracy: Blaming an entire corporate entity for the acts of a 
few individuals is less accurate than blaming only those few individuals. 
 
 75. See infra Part II.A. 
 76. See infra Part II.B. 
 77. See infra Part II.C. 
 78. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1259, 
1273 (1982) (“Since it is a legal fiction, a corporation is incapable of having social or moral obligations 
much in the same way that inanimate objects are incapable of having these obligations.”). 
 79. Professors Fisse and Braithwaite point to Hayak as an example of a relatively extreme 
ontological individualist. Hayak wrote: “There is no other way toward an understanding of social 
phenomena but through our understanding of individual actions directed toward other people and 
guided by their expected behavior.” Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and 
Accountability 19 (1993) (quoting F.A. Hayak, Individualism and Economic Order 6 (1949)).  
 80. Id. at 24 (“Corporations are often regarded as blameworthy, but according to the logic of 
methodological individualism, such blameworthiness reduces to blameworthiness on the part of 
individual representative or to causal responsibility (as opposed to moral responsibility) on the part of 
the corporation.”). This view thus denies there is any responsibility for the corporation apart from the 
responsibility assigned to individual corporate actors. 
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Innocent persons associated with the corporation are wrongfully 
harmed,81 and, to the extent the blame is diluted amongst wrongdoers 
and innocents alike, the wrongdoers escape some portion of their just 
deserts. 
There are two reasons that corporate conduct is not better and more 
accurately described by reference to the individuals through whom the 
entity acts. First, the proposed description is too complex to be useful, 
and the proposed description is subject to challenge with regard to the 
degree and types of detail it must include. Second, the proposed 
description fails to account for the fact that corporations qua 
corporations do have cultures,82 and these cultures—which cannot be 
described solely by reference to individual acts—do influence individuals 
within the corporation. 
1. The Individualist Account Is Unmanageable 
The individualist is correct that there is no single referent in the 
physical world that corresponds with “corporation,” but that does not 
mean the term is indeterminate or empty. Consider the example of a 
decision made by the White House: 
“[T]he White House decided” is a simplification given that many actors 
typically have a say in such decisions. Nevertheless, it is probably less 
of a simplification than the statement “the President has decided.” 
Indeed, it may be fanciful to individualise a collective product. The 
President may never have turned his mind to the decision; he may have 
done no more than waive his power to veto it; or he may have 
delegated the decision totally.83 
The general statement that “the White House decided” may actually 
be more accurate than the specific claim that “the President decided.” 
But this does not quite respond to the individualist claim. The 
individualist would suggest there is a more accurate way to describe the 
decision depending on the actual events that led to the “decision.” For 
example: 
1. The President appointed his Chief of Staff. 
2. The Chief of Staff delegated responsibility for issue X to Staffer A. 
 
 81. The most obvious example of harm caused to innocent people through corporate prosecution 
is that caused to the shareholders. At least for publicly held firms, most shareholders exercise no 
meaningful control over the corporation and thus are, by most measures, innocent of wrongdoing. 
Nonetheless, shareholders suffer harm from criminal prosecution in the form of loss in investment 
value. See John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into 
the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386, 401 (1981) (describing the “overspill of 
the penalty initially imposed on the corporation” as harming innocent stockholders, bondholders, 
creditors, employees, and consumers). 
 82. See supra Part I. 
 83. Fisse & Braithwaite, supra note 79, at 23. 
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3. Staffer A consulted with Congresspersons L through P about issue 
X. 
4. Informed by her discussions with Congresspersons L through P, 
Staffer A consulted with the Chief of Staff. 
5. The Chief of Staff convened a meeting between himself, Staffer A, 
and the President. 
6. The President was unable to attend the meeting because of an 
unrelated event. 
7. The decision had to be made the afternoon of the meeting. The 
President remained unavailable. 
8. The Chief of Staff discussed the issue with Staffer A. 
9. The Chief of Staff instructed Staffer A to draft a press release 
announcing the decision on issue X. 
10. The Press Secretary reviewed and edited the press release, which 
was in turn issued to the public. 
But this description is both lengthy and incomplete. Should we also 
include 3(a): Congressperson L consulted with her Staffer B? Or 3(b): 
Three months earlier, Staffer B met with Lobbyist Q? The list could go 
on ad infinitum.  
So, a practical problem with the individualist account is clear: In its 
effort to achieve accuracy, it adopts unwieldy language. Language is a 
tool; if we make it too complex it does not work. Relatedly, the language 
proposed by the individualist is entirely contrary to the way people talk 
about entities. The fact is, we routinely speak of actions by entities and 
corporations.84 The individualist theory is so at odds with how we talk 
about corporations that it generates at the very least some suspicion as to 
its validity and utility.85 
The more significant problem for the individualist is that the 
proposed language is bound to be misleading even were we able to 
communicate effectively in such detail. It would be misleading because 
 
 84. Consider two entirely unremarkable examples from a single newspaper article: “Health and 
Human Services Secretary [Kathleen Sebelius] publicly overruled the Food and Drug Administration, 
refusing Wednesday to allow emergency contraceptives to be sold over the counter, including to young 
teenagers. . . . Teva Pharmaceuticals, [the pill’s maker], had applied to make Plan B easily accessible to 
everyone.” Gardiner Harris, Plan to Widen Availability of Morning-After Pill Is Rejected, N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 7, 2011, at A1. According to the article, a natural person in a position of authority overruled a 
prior “decision” by an administrative agency. Similarly, the article describes a corporation as 
“mak[ing]” a type of pill and also as having “applied” for permission to market the pill in a particular 
manner. None of this is noteworthy. Indeed, the noteworthy article would be that which tried to 
explain these events without reference to corporation or entity-level actions.  
 85. A related response to the individuals account is made by Sara Beale: “[C]orporations are not 
fictions. Rather, they are enormously powerful, and very real, actors whose conduct often causes very 
significant harm both to individuals and to society as a whole.” Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the 
Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1482, 1482 (2009). Beale expands the 
practical point by noting that “the power now wielded by corporations is both enormous and 
unprecedented in human history.” Id. at 1483. While this response would not satisfy the individualist, 
it does highlight how unhelpful the individualist account can be. 
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there is not likely to be agreement as to what facts are necessary to the 
description. One might reasonably argue that any description beyond the 
specific actions amongst White House personnel is unnecessary, but even 
then accurate descriptions could become unwieldy and subject to 
disagreement. If four staffers were involved in a decision, each might 
have a different understanding and belief about his or her own role in the 
decision. In that case, accuracy might be bolstered by simply describing 
each act and statement made by each person within the White House 
related to the decision, but this description would introduce yet another 
layer of complexity and detail. It, too, would be subject to reasonable 
disagreement as to what acts and statements qualify as “related to the 
decision.” 
Shifting the example to the corporate context, consider an oil spill 
following the burning and sinking of an off-shore drilling platform. The 
platform ignited following an explosion caused by a leak of methane gas. 
The platform designers recognized the risk of such a leak and addressed 
it with a special seal known in the industry as a blowout preventer. In this 
case, the blowout preventer failed to function properly. The blowout 
preventer failed because it had been installed incorrectly. Assume that a 
single corporation built, assembled, owned, and operated the drilling 
platform. An individualist might argue the corporation did none of those 
things (except maybe owning). Rather, three employees of the 
corporation actually installed the blowout preventer. Is it more accurate 
to say that those three employees are responsible for the oil spill than to 
claim the corporation is responsible for the oil spill? No: The former is 
more precise but potentially less complete and thus potentially less 
accurate than the latter. Those three employees may not have been well 
trained. Perhaps a particular Human Resources employee failed to 
coordinate their training when they started. Then again, maybe Human 
Resources customarily took a lax approach to training. Maybe the 
employees were not supplied with proper tools for the task. Their 
supervisor may share the blame for failing to identify, procure, and 
supply the proper tools. Then again, maybe that supervisor failed to do 
so because her supervisor mandated that she make across-the-board 
spending cuts, and those tools were among the cuts. One could carry the 
example on indefinitely. 
The point is, there may be an individualist-reductionist way to 
describe what occurred, but it is likely to be complex, convoluted, and 
incomplete.86 
 
 86. This is but a specific instance of the problem of logical atomism. John Wisdom described the 
problem this way: 
[T]his request for a definition of what it is for individuals to be nationally related as opposed 
to non-nationally related, comes from another great class of unsatisfiable requests for 
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2. The Individualist Account Is Less Accurate for Failing to Account 
for Culture 
The individualist account fails to account for the fact that 
corporations qua corporations influence individual behavior. It fails to 
account for the fact of corporate culture. As described in Part I, 
corporations have cultures, and corporate cultures affect how corporate 
agents behave. The inability of the individualist to account for corporate 
culture undermines its accuracy and utility. The corporate individualist 
can’t see the forest for the trees. 
The individualist might object that nothing is described by reference 
to culture (or the influence of the collective on the individual or teams) 
that cannot also be described by reference to individual actions. Indeed, 
it is conceivable that this is correct, but the objections to describing a 
single corporate act solely by reference to individuals87 become even 
more pronounced if we describe a corporate culture in this manner. To 
properly describe a corporate culture at the individual level, one might 
need to reference decades of actions by tens of thousands of people. 
Even if this were possible, it would be more impractical, less useful, and 
more potentially misleading than the individualist effort to describe a 
single corporate act. As such, it would be less useful and more misleading 
than descriptions of a corporate culture or ethos generally. 
These responses to the individualist objection might not satisfy the 
individualist. The individualist objection is fundamentally an ontological 
objection—namely, there is no property of a corporation that cannot 
(given unlimited time and computing power) be accurately described by 
reference to individual acts.88 As such, this Article does not directly 
engage the objection. Rather, this Article responds that the objection is 
 
analysis. The only definition in terms of individual statements which will mean the same as 
“nationally” will involve the expression “and so on”. The only possible definition of 
“chairishly related” will also involve the expression “and so on”; it will involve an infinite 
disjunction of conjunctions of statements about sensations. And it will be complained that it 
is just this infinity which is mysterious. It is true that if a person is satisfied about the 
category of chairs (or nations) then all that now puzzles him is the nature of the distinction 
between chairish groupings of sensations on the one hand, and non-chairish groupings on 
the other (between national groupings of individuals and non-national). But about this he 
may well be insatiable. 
John Wisdom, Metaphysics and Verification, 47 Mind 452, 478–79 (1938).  
 87. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 88. There may appear to be parallels between the issue of corporate action and the 
reductionism/emergentism debate as it relates to the philosophy of the mind. The apparent parallels 
are, however, predicated on a failure to distinguish between the question being asked in each case. 
With relation to the study of the mind, the question is ontological—is there a phenomena of mental 
activity beyond what is described by reference solely to the physical? With regard to corporations, this 
seems a relatively easy question to answer: No. A corporation is merely the sum of its parts. That it is 
so, however, does not bear directly on the questions of how we can meaningfully describe corporate 
conduct and whether it makes sense to blame a corporation. 
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unhelpful. The goal remains to determine whether and for what purpose 
criminal liability might be imposed on a corporation. The objection that 
there is no meaning to “corporation” that cannot be better described at 
the individual level is belied simply by the practical impossibility and 
inaccuracy of the demanded individualist description. At least until the 
individualist can introduce a meaningful language for describing 
corporate actions only by reference to individuals, the inquiry as to 
corporate criminal liability must proceed by reference to corporate 
action. It may be an imperfect language, but it is the language we have. 
B. Contrary to the Natural Law Account, Capacities Matter, Not 
Personhood 
Moore introduces a significant challenge to any form of corporate 
responsibility from the natural law perspective.89 He contends that moral 
responsibility is reserved for persons.90 “Persons” are those who possess 
certain capacities considered necessary for one to be subject to moral 
responsibility.91 Corporations lack those capacities and therefore cannot 
be subject to moral responsibility. This Part considers Moore’s position 
and concludes that corporations do lack certain capacities people have. 
And Moore is correct that at least some of those capacities are necessary 
for the application of moral desert. However, contrary to Moore’s 
position, punishment may be imposed for reasons other than just deserts 
retributivism—namely, consequentialist reasons. 
1. Certain Capacities Are Necessary for Moral Responsibility 
Moore identifies the capacities necessary for a moral being by 
isolating those aspects of insanity that negate guilt at criminal law.92 Insane 
people lack certain common traits and this explains why they are not 
culpable.93 These traits, according to Moore, are critical to personhood for 
purposes of assigning responsibility.94 
 
 89. Moore, supra note 33, at 595. Of course, not all who could be called natural law theorists 
adhere to this view. For example, Roger Scruton argues in favor of recognizing corporate personhood 
for the specific purpose of bringing corporations within the ambit of responsibility. See Roger Scruton 
& John Finnis, Corporate Persons, 63 Proc. Aristotelian Soc’y, Supplementary Volumes 239, 240–
41 (1989). John Finnis rejects this project altogether. See id. at 274 (“‘Personality’ is a distracting 
metaphor in a realistic moral and political analysis of human associations and their actions.”).  
 90. Moore, supra note 33, at 616–17. 
 91. Id. at 616 (identifying rationality, autonomy, emotionality, unified character, and unified 
consciousness as necessary for moral responsibility). 
 92. Id. at 596. 
 93. Id.  
 94. It is not immediately obvious what work “personhood” is doing in this argument. The 
consequence of the definition is that, as will be discussed below, corporations are not persons. 
However, Moore might have concluded that corporations cannot be criminally liable by reference only 
to the missing attributes that Moore associates with natural persons—omitting any conclusion as to the 
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Moore writes: “Rationality and autonomy are the major 
presuppositions about persons made by the general part of the criminal 
law.”95 To these he adds “emotionality,” which encompasses the capacity 
of having mental states “distinct . . . from beliefs, desires, and intentions.”96 
Although it is a difficult question whether corporations possess rationality 
as defined by Moore, it is quite clear they lack autonomy and 
emotionality. The autonomy Moore requires is the “capacity to choose 
and cause the realization of one’s choice,”97 and “the objects of one’s 
choices are the mental states of desire, belief, intention, and emotion that 
make up one’s character.”98  
This is a place where the utility of speaking of a corporation qua 
corporation begins to break down. While it does make sense to speak of 
a decision by a corporation,99 it makes less sense to speak of a 
corporation having the capacity, qua corporation, to “choose and cause 
the realization of [its] choice.”100 And it makes even less sense to speak of 
a corporation possessing “the mental states of desire, belief, intention, 
and emotion.”101 The legal element of mens rea can be imputed to a 
corporation,102 but that does not mean the corporation is capable of 
having a particular state of mind. When we discuss mental states, the 
analogy between corporations and persons is no longer useful.103 Even 
more clearly, a corporation does not have emotionality. Emotionality is 
the capacity to have mental states other than beliefs, desires, and 
intentions, such as joy, fear, anger, or the experience of seeing red. 
Corporations do not have these capacities; they do not experience 
qualia.104 Returning to the language developed in Part II.A, we might 
 
“personality” of a corporation. See, e.g., Jens David Ohlin, Is the Concept of the Person Necessary for 
Human Rights, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 209 (arguing that “person” is too diffuse and vague a concept to 
contribute to difficult questions of human rights). For more on this issue, see Moore, supra note 33, 
at 610. 
 95. Moore, supra note 33, at 614. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. at 612. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See supra Part II.A. 
 100. Moore, supra note 33, at 612. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493 (1909) (“[A] 
corporation may be liable criminally for certain offenses of which a specific intent may be a necessary 
element. There is no more difficulty in imputing to a corporation a specific intent in criminal 
proceedings than in civil.” (quoting Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass. 294, 297 
(1899))). 
 103. “It is at this point that analytical obscurity has created massive confusion.” Howard M. 
Friedman, Some Reflections on the Corporation as Criminal Defendant, 55 Notre Dame L. Rev. 173, 
180 (1979). 
 104. By qualia I mean what Thomas Nagel described as the “subjective character of experience.” 
Thomas Nagel, What Is It like to Be a Bat?, 83 Phil. Rev. 435, 436 (1974). For Nagel, “fundamentally 
an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that 
Gilchrist_20 (S. ALESSI) (Do Not Delete) 12/19/2012 2:54 PM 
22 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:101 
 
meaningfully say: Corporation A decided to change its logo from red to 
blue, but we would not claim that Corporation A could experience the 
mental phenomenon a natural person experiences upon seeing red. 
2. Personhood Is Not Important 
Corporations are not persons, and to Moore this conclusion matters. 
Moore contends there is a singular and correct answer to the question of 
whether a corporation is a person,105 and about this I disagree. When 
someone asks whether a corporation is a person, she presumably is not 
asking whether a corporation is a living human being, a natural person.106 
She is asking something about how the corporation ought to be treated. 
To answer the question, I would want to know: For what purpose? For 
what purpose would you like to know whether corporations ought to be 
treated as persons? And, in considering how to answer the question, I 
might resort to analogy. It may be useful to note that we punish persons 
and we do not punish trees, to ask what characteristics persons have that 
trees lack, to then ask whether any of these characteristics explain why 
we punish persons and not trees, and finally to assess whether 
corporations are more similar to persons than to trees according only to 
those characteristics. But the entire inquiry begins with the premise that 
we are asking not whether corporations really are persons, but rather 
whether they ought to be treated as persons for a particular purpose. 
For Moore, the question—“Is a corporation is a person?”—is a 
factual one, not a purposeful one, and this stems from the fact that he is a 
moral realist.107 If there are going to be moral facts, there had better be 
facts about objects for the moral facts to reference. Hence, Moore is a 
metaphysical realist about facts.108 A corporation is either a person or it is 
 
organism—something it is like for the organism.” Id. To my thinking, there is nothing it is like to be a 
corporation, just as there is nothing it is like to be a cloud or a pebble. I acknowledge, however, that 
there is considerable debate amongst philosophers on this point (at least with regard to corporations, 
networks, computers, and thermostats, if not clouds and pebbles). That debate is beyond the scope of 
this Article. I will briefly note that even were one’s theory of consciousness to attribute consciousness 
to corporations, I suspect corporate consciousness would be sufficiently different from human 
consciousness so as not to jeopardize the question of moral desert addressed in this Part. 
 105. Moore writes: 
My own view is that the legal and moral questions of whether some entity is or is not a 
person, whether that person performed an action, whether he did so intentionally or with a 
certain motive, whether that act proximately caused harm, whether the actor acted under 
threats of another amounting to duress, and whether the actor is mentally ill, are all factual 
questions. 
Moore, supra note 33, at 624. 
106. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 971 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“The fact that corporations are different from human beings might 
seem to need no elaboration. . . .”). 
 107. Michael Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 Wis. L. Rev. 1061 (1982). 
 108. See Brian Bix, Michael Moore’s Realist Approach to Law, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1293, 1298–300 
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not, and its “personhood”—or lack thereof—will carry moral 
consequences.109  
Moore rejects a functionalist approach, and he considers it 
necessary to do so in order to preserve meaning: “[P]reoccupation with 
the consequences of saying, for example, that a corporation is or is not a 
legal person, cannot be exclusive of some concern as to whether 
corporations are legal persons.”110 But this conclusion assumes there is a 
meaningful and singular answer to the question: Are corporations 
persons? Preoccupation with whether corporations are persons is itself 
the problem. 
Moore’s concern is the loss of certainty,111 but certainty through 
definition can be unnecessarily limiting. Some legal concepts may be 
defined best by reference to their consequences or by their relations to 
other concepts.112 Jeremy Waldron identifies legal terms like 
“corporation” as “tokens” of the “systematic interconnection” of rules.113 
By locating the meaning of legal concepts in the systematic relations 
described by the concepts, Waldron rescues the positivist approach from 
the skepticism and vacuity asserted by Moore.114 We can recognize broad 
 
(1992). 
 109. Moore, supra note 33, at 623 (“If one adopted [a functionalist position] about the legal and 
moral usages of the word ‘person’, one would urge that anything could be called a person—it would 
simply depend on whether one wished to attach the legal or moral consequences of being so labeled to 
that entity.”). 
 110. Id. at 624. 
 111. Id. (“If our legal concepts had as their only meanings that certain consequences could be 
achieved by their use, they would be completely vacuous.”). 
 112. Moore does acknowledge two categories of “things” beyond natural kinds. A nominal kind 
“does not exist as a kind in nature,” and “as a kind its only nature is given by the common label 
attached to various specimens.” Michael S. Moore, Law as a Functional Kind, in Natural Law 
Theory 206 (Robert P. George ed., 1992). A functional kind shares a nature that is “a function and not 
a structure.” Id. at 208. As such, “items making up a functional kind have a nature that they share that 
is richer than the ‘nature’ of merely sharing a common name in some language.” Id. Brian Bix has 
expressed some skepticism about whether or how “functional kinds” fit within Moore’s metaphysical 
realism. See Bix, supra note 108, at 1329 (“Unlike other aspects of Moore’s metaphysical realist 
approach to law, the discussion of ‘functional kinds’ seems to make no ontological or epistemological 
claims (or to require any special ontological or epistemological assumptions).”). If one understands 
Moore’s categories as Bix does, it may appear that Moore does not disagree with the functionalist 
approach Waldron described. See infra text accompanying notes 114–120; see also Bix, supra note 108, 
at 1329 (“I do not believe that [Moore] has claimed (let alone proven) anything with which critics of 
metaphysical realism need disagree.”).  
 113. Jeremy Waldron, “Transcendental Nonsense” and System in the Law, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 16, 
25 (2000). 
 114. Waldron describes the meaning of theoretical terms that seem to defy clear definition as 
follows:  
Theoretical terms are—if you like—flags of systematicity. In their very abstraction from 
ordinary usage, they remind us that we are dealing with a web-like structure, not just 
individual items on a list of propositions. . . . The use of technical expressions like 
“corporation,” “legal personality,” “jurisdiction,” “locus standi,” and the like alerts us to the 
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systematic meaning—and even the potential instrumental assignment of 
meaning—without losing meaning altogether.115 Accepting contextual 
definitions of legal concepts does not eradicate meaning; it shifts the 
referent of the concept from an ideal to a function, a relation, or a 
circumstance.116 There are things we can know about what it is to be a 
corporation, but we cannot list all the things that could possibly be 
known about corporationhood. There is no perfect and complete 
definition of “corporation.”117 At the same time, definitions matter. How 
we define a corporation at law will have consequences,118 and to the 
extent we can foresee those consequences they ought to inform the 
definition. 
To proceed otherwise risks what Hart criticized as “the growth of 
theory on the back of definition.”119 The natural law theorist views the 
legal definition as a deep fact about the world.120 Accordingly, definitions 
are called upon for some heavy lifting.121 Hart rejected this understanding 
 
fact that the members of an array of legal rules are understood to be related to one another 
systematically, so that (for example) there will be consequences for what we say about 
standing to sue commercial enterprises if we reorganize the internal boundaries of our legal 
system, and consequences for what we say about civil procedure if we offer legal recognition 
to new forms of commercial enterprise. 
Id. at 23. 
 115. One difference between Moore and a positivist is simply what each demands of and expects 
from definition. “If our legal concepts had as their only meanings that certain consequences could be 
achieved by their use, they would be completely vacuous.” Moore, supra note 33, at 624. Moore’s 
functional kinds would appear to admit some flexibility to this standard (by identifying kinds through 
common function), but for Moore, definition is always an exercise of discovery, never assertion. “In 
order to find the meaning of ‘pain’ we must build a theory about the true nature of pain, and there can 
be no sufficient conditions that fix the meaning of ‘pain.’ We fix the meaning as we discover more and 
more about what pain really is.” Moore, supra note 107, at 1130.  
 116. In this way, theoretical legal terms as described by Waldron are not different than all terms as 
described by Quine. See Willard Van Orman Quine, Word and Object 35–61 (1960). 
 117. Again, this really amounts to a restatement of the problem of logical atomism. See supra Part 
II.A.1. 
 118. Waldron, supra note 113, at 23 (“[T]here will be consequences for what we say about standing 
to sue commercial enterprises if we reorganize the internal boundaries of our legal system, and 
consequences for what we say about civil procedure if we offer legal recognition to new forms of 
commercial enterprise.”). 
 119. H.L.A. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence 7 (1953).  
 120. Moore, supra note 107, at 1130. 
 121. Justice Frankfurter famously rejected the definition-driven approach in deciding whether federal 
courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply state statutes of limitations. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. 
York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). Casting aside the rigid restraint of a substance/procedure distinction, 
Frankfurter explained: 
Matters of “substance” and matters of “procedure” are much talked about in the books as 
though they defined a great divide cutting across the whole domain of law. But, of course, 
“substance” and “procedure” are the same keywords to very different problems. Neither 
“substance” nor “procedure” represents the same invariants. Each implies different 
variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is used. 
Id. at 108. 
Gilchrist_20 (S. ALESSI) (Do Not Delete) 12/19/2012 2:54 PM 
December 2012]         EXPRESSIVE COST OF CORPORATE IMMUNITY 25 
 
of legal definitions and instead advocated using the analogies inherent in 
definitions to illustrate, rather than resolve, issues.122 Thus, rather than 
ask what is a corporation, we should ask, for example, “[u]nder what 
types of conditions does the law ascribe liabilities to corporations?”123 
The latter question will “clarify the actual working of a legal system and 
bring out the precise issues at stake when judges . . . make some new 
extension to corporate bodies of rules worked out for individuals.”124 
Hart also illustrates the flaw in prioritizing definition: It demands a 
logical consistency of terms, but its terms were developed in context and 
by analogy, and without consideration of all possible circumstances 
under which that term would or would not be effective.125 So, although it 
may make sense for a court to rule, in a particular context and for a 
particular purpose, that a corporation will be treated as a person, there is 
little reason to suggest that, as a result, in all contexts and for all 
purposes, corporations must be treated as persons and the legal 
consequences that follow from that designation are predetermined by the 
initial designation in an entirely unrelated context.126 
3.  Moral Capacity Is Necessary for Just Deserts Retributivism but 
Not for Consequentialism 
The personhood of corporations is really not the issue. The 
culpability—or blameworthiness—of corporations is what we care 
about.127 The attributes Moore isolates as critical to personhood are those 
 
 122. Hart, supra note 119, at 25 (“By contrast the confusing way of stating the issue is to bring in 
definitions of what a Company is and to deduce from them answers to the question in hand.”). 
 123. Id. at 24. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 25 (“These statements confuse the issue because they look like eternal truths about the 
nature of corporations given us by definitions: so it is made to appear that all legal statements about 
corporations must square with these if they are not to be logically inconsistent.”). 
 126. Judge Posner makes a similar point about the limits of analogy in Overcoming Law. See 
Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 518–19 (1996). Joan Heminway argues that this point underlies 
the difference between Justice Stevens and the majority in Citizens United: 
Under the Court's view in Citizens United, it appears that once one concludes that a 
corporation is a person, it is a person for all purposes, bar none. As the Stevens opinion 
points out, this ignores policy underpinnings of the various laws that may use the concept of 
corporate personhood. 
Joan Heminway, Thoughts on the Corporation as a Person for Purposes of Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 41 Stetson L. Rev. 137, 143 (2011) (footnote omitted). 
 127. Moore does care about personhood. Moore, supra note 33, at 610. He suggests that, should 
other forms of life with comparable capacities be discovered, it might be appropriate to amend the 
definition of person to require “embodiment in a human body.” Id. at 618. Thus, it appears Moore 
does require responsibility be assigned only to those that share certain capacity attributes with natural 
persons and that are natural persons. It remains unclear to me what work personhood is doing or why 
it matters unless we introduce non-materialist data. And Moore may be doing just that. See Moore, 
supra note 112, at 190–91 (defending a natural law theory predicated on the theses that moral qualities 
do exist and that “such qualities are mind- and convention-independent”).  
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attributes that give the capacity to make a rational choice.128 And this 
matters, because for Moore, retributivism, and only retributivism, 
justifies punishment: “[W]e ought to punish offenders because and only 
because they deserve to be punished.”129 “For Moore, moral culpability is 
the same as desert.”130 
If we can only punish—and if we can only hold responsible—those 
that deserve punishment,131 Moore’s conclusion about who or what may 
be held responsible seems correct.132 Moore contends that responsibility 
is necessarily linked to cognitive and volitional capacities.133 And this 
comports with how we generally think of responsibility.134 As much as 
corporations do have cultures,135 and as much as those corporate cultures 
can influence real persons in the corporation in their choice to commit 
crimes,136 a corporation lacks mental states,137 and therefore cannot be 
said to rationally choose a culture for itself.138 Corporations act, but they 
do not think in a way that accords with the concept of just deserts.139 
 
 128. Moore identifies the key features of personhood as rationality and autonomy. See Moore, 
supra note 33, at 610. 
 129. Id. at 153.  
 130. Dan Markel, What Might Retributive Justice Be?, in Retributivism: Essays on Theory and 
Policy 65 n.6 (Mark White ed., 2011).  
 131. Sara Beale counters the conventional wisdom on this point, by noting that even outside the 
realm of corporate criminal liability, we fail to “confin[e] criminal liability to moral blameworthiness.” 
See Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 
1482, 1488–90 (2009) (giving examples of schizophrenia, accomplice liability, and strict liability 
crimes). 
 132. Al Alschuler pokes fun at the idea of blaming a corporation this way: 
People indignant about an injury produced by a corporation’s employees may treat the 
corporation as deodand. They may truly personify and hate the corporation. They may hate 
the mahogany paneling, the Lear jet, the smokestack, the glass tower, and all of the people 
inside. They—the mahogany and all of them—are responsible for the medical fraud, the oil 
spill, the price fixing, and the illegal campaign contributions. To superstitious people, 
villains need not breathe. They may include Exxon, Warner Lambert, and the cable 
company. 
Alschuler, supra note 21, at 1336. 
 133. See Moore, supra note 33, at 588. 
 134. “Guns don’t shoot people, people do.” Of course, absent a gun, a person cannot be shot. But 
the power of the statement comes not from a causal analysis, but from a volitional analysis. Absent a 
gun, a person cannot be shot; but so too, absent a person operating the gun, a person cannot be shot 
(in all but the most outlandish examples). The gun and the person are both necessary and not 
sufficient causes of a person being shot. The difference is, a person can be blamed (and influenced); a 
gun cannot. So too we do not blame the moose that wrecks a car or the tornado that destroys a house. 
But see Paul Schiff Berman, Rats, Pigs and Statues on Trial: The Creation of Cultural Narratives in the 
Prosecution of Animals and Inanimate Objects, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 288 (1994) (reviewing and analyzing 
historical cases of putting animals and inanimate objects on trial). 
 135. See supra Part I. 
 136. See supra Part I. 
  137. See supra text accompanying note 104. 
 138. See supra text accompanying notes 98–115. 
 139. There are arguments to the contrary. See, e.g., Pettit, supra note 72. This Article does not 
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But maybe we need not limit culpability to a just deserts model, and 
we need not limit the imposition of criminal liability to an exclusive 
retributivist model.140 Imposition of criminal liability might be imposed—
even if we do not think it is deserved—so long as we think it is effective. 
This is not to suggest that desert should never be a limiting principle; 
rather, it is to consider that the reasons for demanding that desert limit 
the imposition of criminal liability on people may not apply when 
considering the imposition of criminal liability on corporations.141 
 
4. The Possibility of Undeserved, but Efficacious, Corporate 
Liability 
Assigning responsibility for solely instrumental reasons might seem 
contrary to our basic understanding of responsibility.142 There is a moral 
limit on the assignment of criminal responsibility in the form of fairness. 
Assessing responsibility based on something other than capacity and 
intention might appear “unfair, in that it holds us responsible for that 
which we could not have helped—our selves—rather than for that which 
we have chosen to do, or could have chosen not to do.”143 
Efficacy is not the only good. 
The moral concept of fairness is also a good.144 A functionally 
efficacious assignment of responsibility may still be rejected as unfair. 
 
engage those arguments, not because they are not compelling, but rather because they do not affect 
the thesis of this Article. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 140. Moore offers significant justification for his view that punishment ought to be imposed 
because, and only because, it is deserved, hinging on what might be called the value of empathetic 
moral outrage. His view—in part—is that, while there may be virtue in turning the other cheek if 
you’ve been slapped, “there is no virtue in turning someone else’s cheek when they have been 
slapped.” Moore, supra note 33, at 164. Furthermore, Moore believes there is a non-instrumental 
virtue in condemning moral wrongs. Id. at 163–65. I disagree with Moore’s conclusions regarding the 
value of positive retributivism (punishment if and only if deserved), but this broader issue of the 
purpose of punishment is beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice to say the position that punishment 
can be justified on non-retributivist grounds is not unique. 
 141. Invoking retribution as a limiting principle is often referred to as negative retributivism. See J. 
L. Mackie, Morality and the Retributive Emotions, 1 Crim. Just. Ethics 3, 4 (1982). “Within what can 
broadly be called a retributive theory of punishment, we should distinguish negative retributivism, the 
principle that one who is not guilty must not be punished, from positive retributivism, the principle 
that one who is guilty ought to be punished.” Id. To be clear, Moore is positive retributivist. See 
Moore, supra note 33, at 33 (“Retributive justice demands that those who deserve punishment get 
it.”). 
 142. The common understanding of responsibility is captured by Moore. See supra notes 91–95 and 
accompanying text. It is a capacity-based responsibility. 
 143. See Nicola Lacey, Responsibility and Modernity in Criminal Law, 9 J. Pol. Phil. 249, 263 
(2001). 
 144. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 181 (2004). 
We can easily rationalize the sacrifice of procedural justice from a consequentialist 
perspective. The measurable marginal benefits of participationless procedure may exceed 
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Imprisoning all members of a particular ethnic group after a terrorist 
attack might reduce terrorism if it were known that the terrorism was 
being perpetrated only or even predominantly by members of that 
group.145 Still, assuming this were a known effective method of reducing 
terrorism, moral principles of fairness and legal principles of due process 
would counsel against the reaction.146 
Retribution as a rationale for punishment (or the assignment of 
responsibility) responds to this concern. Retribution does not so much 
justify the assignment of responsibility as limit it.147 Only those who 
deserve blame may be punished.148 Were we to assign blame and 
apportion punishment solely on utilitarian grounds, then persons who did 
not commit offenses may, in some cases, be held responsible and 
punished because doing so generates greater compliance with the 
substantive rules.149 
Nicola Lacey presents a surprising but compelling conception of 
responsibility that permits the legal imposition of responsibility for 
purely instrumental reasons.150 Lacey cautions against the assumption 
 
the marginal costs. In the end, however, these rationalizations ring hollow. Procedure 
without justice sacrifices legitimacy. Law without legitimacy can only guide action through 
force and fear. 
Id. at 321; see also, Gregory M. Gilchrist, Plea Bargains, Convictions and Legitimacy, 48 Am. Crim. L. 
Rev. 143, 162 (2011) (“[T]he perception of procedural fairness is critical to fostering public confidence 
in the legal system.”). 
 145. It is worth noting that—even on this unduly certain hypothetical—it is by no means clear that 
such broad imprisonment would be effective. It would be ineffective if the perceived overbreadth of 
punishment undermined others’ incentive to obey the law. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal 
Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. Legal Stud. 289, 294 (1983) (“Penalties may fall on law abiders, 
and thus there is less reason to obey the law and abjure the gains of crime.”). 
 146. But cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 147. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 453, 478 
(1997) (“[D]eviation from a desert distribution can incrementally undercut the criminal law’s moral 
credibility, which in turn can undercut its ability to help in the creation and internalization of norms 
and its power to gain compliance by its moral authority.”). In this, Moore and Hart align, albeit briefly 
and incompletely. Compare Michael Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in Responsibility, 
Character and the Emotions 179, 180 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) (“A retributivist will 
subscribe to [the view that only the guilty are to be punished].”), with H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and 
Responsibility 181 (2009) (“Thus a primary vindication of the principle of responsibility could rest on 
the simple idea that unless a man has the capacity and fair opportunity or chance to adjust his behavior 
to the law its penalties ought not to be applied to him.”). The difference, for Moore, is that the 
retributivist believes desert is not only a necessary condition of punishment, but a sufficient condition. 
Moore, supra note 33, at 180. 
 148. See Hart, supra note 147, at 8–13; see also Markel, supra note 130, at 51 (“Retributive 
punishment for legal wrongdoing is justified in part because in treating the offender as a responsible 
moral agent it communicates to him a respect for his dignity as an autonomous moral agent.”). 
 149. Again, there may be utilitarian arguments against this practice that require no reference to 
retribution. See supra note 145. But, there almost certainly would be cases at the margins in which a 
pure utilitarian calculus counsels assigning blame to the non-blameworthy. Requiring a retributive 
function for punishment guards against that result. 
 150. See Lacey, supra note 143, at 249–76. 
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that legal and moral responsibility are coextensive and share 
philosophical foundations.151 And she presents a historical argument that 
capacity-based responsibility in criminal law is a relatively recent 
phenomenon: Historically, responsibility was assessed not in light of 
capacity, but rather in light of character and reputation.152 
Lacey suggests that “we let go of the metaphysical fantasy that 
responsibility just ‘is’ a certain kind of thing, and think instead of 
responsibility as a normative device—a matter of construction and 
ascription—then we can begin to ask common questions about 
responsibility across social institutions.”153 This move echoes Hart: The 
legal definition as an ontological quest is unhelpful and potentially 
misleading. 
Moral responsibility may hold claim to metaphysical status,154 but 
criminal responsibility does not. Criminal responsibility, as a legal 
concept, is instrumental and circumstantial, but that is not to say it is 
devoid of meaning. Criminal responsibility has meaning; that meaning, 
however, is contingent on the systematic relations among a wide range of 
legal rules. Legal responsibility may be assigned to corporations, or 
apples or unicorns, or none of these things. Whether we assign 
responsibility to a corporation will have consequences.155 We may judge 
from those consequences whether we wish to assign responsibility to 
corporations or not.156 
Here we can begin to see the power of Moore’s conclusion that 
corporations lack the critical capacities we often associate with 
blameworthiness.157 Corporations do not have autonomy or 
 
 151. Id. at 253–54. 
 152. Lacey writes: 
[C]ertain key facts suggest that the understanding of criminal responsibility at the time of 
Blackstone did not lie in findings about the defendant’s cognitive or volitional capacities, let 
alone in his or her subjective state of mind in the way that psychology has taught us to think 
about responsibility conditions such as ‘intention’ today. Rather, it lay in an evaluation of 
the defendant’s conduct judged in the light of evidence about his or her character and 
reputation. 
Id. at 257. 
 153. See id. at 275. 
 154. Natural law theory is more closely associated with moral realism, and because natural law 
theory is often in opposition to legal positivism, it might be assumed that legal positivism is not 
compatible with moral realism. That assumption is erroneous. As Jeremy Waldron explains: “[L]egal 
positivism is meta-ethically neutral. It takes no position on the nature of moral judgement. It is 
compatible with moral realism and with moral anti-realism. All it says is that legal decision-making is 
one thing, moral judg[]ment another.” Jeremy Waldron, The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity, in 
Natural Law Theory 158, 161 (Robert P. George ed., 1992). 
 155. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 156. See supra text accompanying notes 111–118. 
 157. See supra text accompanying notes 91–107. 
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emotionality.158 As such, they do not deserve blame.159 It is not that they 
do not deserve blame because they cannot act in a manner that is 
harmful to others.160 And it is not that they do not deserve blame because 
they cannot cause others to act badly.161 They do not deserve blame 
because they lack the volitional capacities we associate with moral 
blameworthiness.162 
Retribution applies only to those that deserve blame.163 And just as 
we should not be angry with a corporation, we also should not feel 
empathy for a corporation. The corporation lacks this degree of moral 
standing because it lacks the capacities of a natural person.164 Blame does 
not apply, but neither does fairness.165 
Hart declared the need for a retributive basis for punishment in 
order to protect against the potential injustice of punishment 
apportioned on mere utilitarian grounds.166 People understand other 
people to act intentionally, based on the sorts of capacities Moore 
identified as key to personhood.167 Only people who act intentionally are 
worthy of blame.168 And blaming those who lack the capacity to act 
intentionally would be unfair; it would also tend to undermine public 
respect for the system that imparted blame unfairly.169 
 
 158. See supra text accompanying notes 96–98. 
 159. See Hart, supra note 147, at 181 (“[U]nless a man has the capacity and fair opportunity or 
chance to adjust his behaviour to the law its penalties ought not to be applied to him.”). 
 160. They can. See supra text accompanying notes 79–87. 
 161. They can. See supra text accompanying notes 35–90. 
 162. See supra text accompanying notes 92–103. 
 163. See Moore, supra note 33, at 33 (“Retributive justice demands that those who deserve 
punishment get it.”). Not all retributivists accept this limit. Dan Markel presents a fascinating theory 
of retributivism predicated not on desert, but on a communication to an actor about consequences, 
which communication also is pregnant with the recognition that the actor has the capacity to alter 
conduct in accord with the communication. See Markel, supra note 130, at 50–51. Markel’s 
Confrontational Conception of Retributivism (“CCR”) would be applicable to corporations (so long 
as one accepts my premises that corporations can influence conduct of their agents and that 
corporations can change in response to external stimuli) where Moore’s more traditional conception 
of retributivism would not. In this regard, CCR may disentangle complete-personhood capacity from 
the imposition of criminal liability as effectively as the recognition that corporations can be subject to 
purely consequentialist manipulation in a way natural persons cannot be. CCR is not the same as 
consequentialism, see id. at 59–60, but it too might be a fruitful mechanism for explaining corporate 
criminal liability. 
 164. See supra text accompanying notes 128–139. 
 165. To be clear, fairness does not apply to corporations qua corporations. Fairness considerations 
would apply to the natural persons affiliated with the corporation. For more on this, see infra note 171. 
 166. See Hart, supra note 147, at 12. 
 167. Moore, supra note 33, at 588. 
 168. Hence, the insane are not guilty. See id. at 595. 
 169. Hart described the risk this way: 
Human society is a society of persons; and persons do not view themselves or each other 
merely as so many bodies moving in ways which are sometimes harmful and have to be 
prevented or altered. Instead persons interpret each other’s movements as manifestations of 
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Applied to corporations, however, this concern carries diminished 
weight. Fairness no more applies to corporations than does blame. Hart 
rightly worried about a system that “treated men merely as alterable, 
predictable, curable or manipulable things.”170 But it is difficult to 
understand an objection—sociological or moral—to treating 
corporations exactly this way.171 As a result, a purely consequentialist 
theory of punishment might justify corporate criminal liability in a way it 
could not justify criminal liability for people. 
C. Concurring with the Efficiency Challenge, Deterrence Alone 
Cannot Justify Corporate Criminal Liability 
Corporations can be deterred by criminal liability, but that fact may 
not justify criminal liability. After all, perhaps corporations could be 
deterred by civil liability just as well, and more efficiently. This is the 
argument made by Vikramaditya Khanna in Corporate Criminal Liability: 
What Purpose Does It Serve?172 Khanna argues that corporate criminal 
liability is an inefficient tool for influencing corporate behavior. He 
concludes that criminal liability for corporations is more costly and 
ultimately no more effective than civil liability.173 
This Part first demonstrates the basic point that corporations are 
susceptible to deterrence. It then considers Khanna’s argument that 
deterrence cannot justify corporate criminal liability. For the most part, I 
agree with Khanna’s conclusions. However, while deterrence alone is not 
 
intention and choices, and these subjective factors are often more important to their social 
relations than the movements by which they are manifested or their effects. . . . This is how 
human nature in human society actually is and as yet we have no power to alter it. The 
bearing of this fundamental fact on the law is this. If as our legal moralists maintain it is 
important for the law to reflect common judgments of morality, it is surely even more 
important that it should in general reflect in its judgments on human conduct distinctions 
which not only underly morality, but pervade the whole of our social life. This it would fail 
to do if it treated men merely as alterable, predictable, curable, or manipulable things. 
Hart, supra note 147, at 182–83. 
 170. Id. at 183. 
 171. This is not to suggest, by any means, there would not be concerns about the fairness of a legal 
action against a corporation considered in terms of real people affected. In deciding to apply criminal 
liability to a corporation, there will be real issues of fairness to the corporation’s shareholders, 
employees, creditors, customers, and others. But the point addressed in this Section is that assessing 
responsibility based on something other than its capacity and intention is unfair. Since corporations 
have no capacity and intention, assessing responsibility against the corporation might appear unfair. 
But, just as corporations have no capacity and intention, so too there is a diminished demand for 
“fairness” to the corporation qua corporation. Accordingly, the fairness concern—as applied to the 
corporation—is empty. Fairness must remain a central concern with regard to natural persons affected 
by the imposition of liability on a corporation. 
 172. Khanna, supra note 22. 
 173. Id. at 1533–34. 
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sufficient to justify criminal liability over civil liability for corporations, 
expressivism can justify criminal over civil liability. 
1. Corporations Can Be Deterred 
Corporate criminal liability can change corporate conduct for the 
better. A corporation found criminally liable might terminate bad actor 
personnel. It might redesign reporting structures to avoid or limit future 
problems. It might change compensation practices to remove incentives 
that could lead to misconduct. Indeed, given the diversity of corporate 
functions, corporate structures, and potentially illegal corporate conduct, 
the spectrum of possible changes is nearly unlimited.174 Specific deterrence 
occurs when a company makes changes such as these in an effort to avoid 
subsequent wrongdoing.175 General deterrence occurs when a company 
makes such changes not in response to its own liability, but in response to 
the liability of another corporation and in an effort to avoid similar future 
liability.176 
Corporations are deterred by the threat of punishment. Punishment 
for corporations might take a number of forms. A corporation could be 
compelled to pay money or be put on probation for the violation.177 It 
 
 174. The very complexity of potential problems and fixes renders ex ante and uniform 
prescriptions for corporate change potentially problematic. This fact represents a challenge for 
suggestions that criminal liability for corporations include a good faith defense that could be satisfied 
by an effective compliance program. See Ellen S. Podger, A New Corporate World Mandates a “Good 
Faith” Affirmative Defense, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1537, 1538 (2007) (“To properly reward law-abiding 
corporations, an affirmative defense should be offered to those who present ‘good faith’ efforts to 
achieve compliance with the law as demonstrated in their corporate compliance program.”); Charles J. 
Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense to Criminal Liability: Can a 
Corporation Save Its Soul?, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 605, 676 (1995) (“A corporation should be able to 
defend against vicarious criminal liability by showing that it had a clear and effective policy for 
complying with the law in place at the time of the violation, and that the employee’s acts violated that 
policy.”). These proposals have gained political steam lately as the Chamber of Commerce has 
initiated a lobbying effort to revise one of the statutes most actively enforced against corporations. See 
Weissman & Smith, supra note 25 (urging implementation of a compliance defense to the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq.). Professor Kim Krawiec has written about the 
concern that such a defense might generate costly but largely cosmetic compliance programs ill-suited 
to actually deter corporate wrongdoing. Krawiec, supra note 38. The sheer complexity of and variation 
between entities, corporate cultures, corporate functions, potential problems, and potential fixes is 
another problem with the good faith compliance defense. I consider the desirability and efficacy of a 
good faith defense further in Condemnation without Basis: An Expressive Failure of Corporate 
Prosecutions, 64 Hastings L.J. (forthcoming 2013). 
 175. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 556 (1975) (defining specific deterrence as 
“punishing an individual so that he will not repeat the same behavior”). 
 176. See United States v. Politano, 522 F.3d 69, 74 (2008) (“General deterrence is about preventing 
criminal behavior by the population at large and, therefore, incorporates some consideration of 
persons beyond the defendant.”). 
 177. See 18 U.S.C. § 3551(c) (2006) (permitting a sentence of probation and/or the imposition of a 
fine against an organization convicted of a crime). 
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could be barred from some aspect of its business.178 It could be subjected 
to any number of requirements as a condition of its probation.179 The 
Securities and Exchange Commission has issued innovative sanctions in 
the civil context.180 Many of these corporate governance sanctions might 
also be imposed in the criminal realm.181 Fundamentally, though, for a 
corporation, any penalty should be translatable to money. A fine of 
X dollars to be paid immediately is a loss of X dollars. Being barred from 
an aspect of the business for two years, where that aspect of the business 
generates Y dollars, is a loss of at least Y dollars.182 Reporting 
requirements have at minimum a transaction cost that is a loss of Z dollars. 
Whatever it is, it’s money to the corporation.183 
Corporations maximize money.184 This statement, of course, is grossly 
simplified. Just as one will find nuance, complexity, and confusion in trying 
to identify the precise manner in which a corporation acts,185 one will find 
the same difficulties in identifying precisely why a corporation acts.186 
These disputes are related to the fact that speaking of a corporation 
acting is a sort of shorthand. In fact, different people with disparate 
 
 178. See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. § 9.405(a) (2012) (“Contractors debarred, suspended, or proposed for 
debarment are excluded from receiving contracts, and agencies shall not solicit offers from, award 
contracts to, or consent to subcontracts with these contractors, unless the agency head determines that 
there is a compelling reason for such action.”). As currently defined, debarment is not punishment but 
rather a distinct collateral consequence of conviction. However, there is no deep reason that this must 
be the case, and debarment, exclusion, or other probationary penalties could be incorporated into 
punishments. 
 179. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (listing possible conditions of probation). 
 180. Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Therapeutics at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
2008 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 793, 796 (2008) (“[T]hese undertakings have required the creation of new 
management positions, adoption of new accounting and reporting practices, reconfiguration of 
corporate training programs, and establishment of specific board-level committees and procedures.”). 
 181. Id. at 795 (“The[] reforms [the DOJ has required in criminal actions] have included the 
appointment of an independent monitor, the implementation of a detailed legal compliance program, 
specific prescriptions regarding management’s communications with outside auditors, splitting the 
positions of CEO and Chairman, and the appointment of additional outside directors.”(footnotes 
omitted)). 
 182. It may be more, depending on the external value that aspect of the business had and the 
collateral consequences of being barred from the business for a period. 
 183. Which is not to say all punishments are equally easy to value in terms of dollars, a corporation 
can likely more easily measure the financial impact of a specific fine to be paid by a date certain than it 
can measure the financial impact of debarment or monitoring.  
 184. This phenomenon is more frequently described as “corporations maximize profits,” or 
“corporations maximize shareholder interests.” As the remainder of this paragraph describes, each of 
these is both correct and incomplete. For purposes of the instant analysis, the significantly more vague 
statement “corporations maximize money” is sufficient.  
 185. See supra text accompanying notes 33–88. 
 186. See Jack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The New International Law Scholarship, 34 Ga J. Int’l 
& Comp. L. 463, 475 (2006) (“When economists model the behavior of corporations, they often assume 
that corporations maximize value to shareholders; but sometimes they assume that corporations 
maximize the interests of their managers or some combination of shareholders’ and managers’ 
interests.”). 
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incentives take independent actions that result in what is usefully 
described as corporate conduct.187 Some of these actions may not be 
profit maximizing for the corporation (where, for example, a manager 
makes departmental cuts that will increase his annual bonus but which 
do not serve the purpose of maximizing corporate profits).188 Still, at the 
most general level, it is largely uncontroversial that corporations are 
profit-maximizing actors and corporate conduct will generally, if not 
perfectly, trend toward making more money and losing less money.189 
That which results in a net deprivation of corporate money will be 
disfavored. So, criminal liability for corporations—a rule that creates the 
risk of costing the corporation money should the corporation be found in 
violation of it—should have some tendency to shift the behavior of the 
corporation.190 
2. Deterrence Alone Cannot Justify Corporate Criminal Liability 
So corporations can be deterred by criminal liability, but does 
criminal liability do anything that civil liability could not do more 
cheaply? Khanna identifies four characteristics differentiating criminal 
and civil corporate liability:191 “Corporate criminal liability has stronger 
 
 187. See Roderick M. Kramer & David M. Messick, Ethical Cognition and the Framing of 
Organizational Dilemmas: Decision Makers as Intuitive Lawyers, in Codes of Conduct 59 (David M. 
Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996) (“[I]t has long been appreciated that cooperative choice 
entails trade-offs between individual and collective interests and between short-term and long-term 
gains and losses.”). For a compelling analysis of factors influencing group decision making, see 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1, 19–32 (2002). 
 188. One might be tempted to dismiss instances such as this as malfunctions in incentive 
structures—a circumstantial technical flaw in a particular instance. This would probably underestimate 
the challenge of aligning individual incentives with the best interests of the corporation in all cases. 
Especially with large organizations, the complexity of decision making and reporting structures is 
likely such that no amount of time or good intentions can create a perfect alignment of individual 
incentives with corporate best interests (even assuming, perhaps incorrectly, that people could agree 
on the correct measure of “corporate best interests”). Accordingly, I do not mean to downplay the 
magnitude of individual/entity conflicts or the challenge they present for corporate governance 
generally. On the other hand, the general statement that corporations tend to act towards maximizing 
profits and/or shareholder interest is correct. 
 189. Hence the models generally relied on by economists. See supra note 187. 
 190. Ian Lee captures the theory of corporate liability incentives as follows: 
Many economic theorists of the firm believe that market forces lead rational individuals to 
create corporate arrangements in which managers and the board of directors have strong 
incentives to maximize corporate profits. From this belief, it follows that society has reason 
to be concerned that managers and boards may cause corporations to pursue profits 
regardless of the cost for society. But, it also follows that the behaviour of managers and 
boards of directors will be highly responsive to corporate liability; monetary sanctions 
affecting the corporation’s bottom line will cause corporate managers and boards of 
directors to internalize the social costs of their decisions.  
Lee, supra note 40, at 758. 
 191. Khanna also aptly notes that the distinction is oversimplistic, and that “[n]umerous corporate 
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procedural protections; more powerful enforcement devices; more severe 
and, arguably, unique sanctions (such as stigma); and a greater message-
sending role than corporate civil liability.”192 To determine whether 
corporate criminal liability is socially desirable (in comparison with civil 
liability), he considers whether and when these characteristics of criminal 
liability are desirable.193 He analyzes the desirability of each characteristic 
according to whether,194 how well, and at what cost, it serves the purpose 
of imposing liability on corporations in the first place.195 Khanna’s 
analysis finds that in most cases, the distinctive characteristics of criminal 
liability are either not socially desirable as applied to corporations, or 
insufficiently distinctive to justify criminal liability instead of civil 
liability.196 
a. Sanctioning Characteristics 
Criminal sanctions are one of the most distinctive aspects of criminal 
justice. Often we know that a proceeding is criminal because the defendant 
has life or liberty at stake. Civil proceedings generally cannot result in the 
deprivation of life or liberty as a direct sanction;197 criminal proceedings 
can. Of course—as has long been noted198—a corporation has no liberty of 
which it may be deprived.199 The direct sanctions for corporate criminal 
 
liability strategies form a continuum between these two extremes.” Khanna, supra note 22, at 1493. 
While this is true as long as the discussion remains abstract, in the context of the U.S. criminal justice 
system there are clear distinctions and consequences that will follow depending on whether a liability 
scheme is categorized as civil or criminal. Accordingly, I understand his statement that “[t]he label 
placed on each corporate liability strategy along the continuum between criminal and civil liability is 
unimportant” to be about the theory of corporate liability, abstracted from the requirements of a 
particular legal system. Id. 
 192. Id. at 1492. As Khanna notes, the distinction is inherently simplistic, and there may well be 
hybrid systems of liability that involve some, but not all, of these factors. Id. at 1493. Additionally, 
these factors could each be present to a greater or lesser degree. Id. 
 193. Id. at 1493. 
 194. Khanna avoids the concerns of the natural law theorist by asserting that “deterrence, not 
retribution, [is] the aim of both corporate criminal liability and corporate civil liability.” Id. at 1494. 
 195. Id. at 1493. 
 196. Id. at 1533 (“[C]orporate criminal liability would only be socially desirable in the rarest of 
circumstances.”). 
 197. Exceptions would include civil contempt or involuntary commitment as a result of mental 
illness. 
 198. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 81, at 390. 
 199. One might argue that a corporation has a life of which it might be deprived by sanction. The 
analogy of a corporate death penalty is poor because those sanctions that result in the end of 
corporate viability are available civilly as well and thus cannot be compared to the individual death 
penalty. Indeed, perhaps this description is backwards. Just as the concepts of desert and fairness do 
not apply to corporations as they apply to individuals, so too the concept of death does not apply to 
corporations as it applies to individuals. As a result, what might bear a passing resemblance to death 
with respect to a corporation is so different than actual death that the procedural requirements for its 
imposition are not comparable. 
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wrongdoing will be monetary (or easily monetized).200 As described above, 
a corporation may be fined, put on probation, or subject to debarment-
type sanctions.201 It may even be terminated.202 Each of these sanctions is 
interchangeable with fines. Business lost from debarment has value; 
licenses have value; monitoring and probation carry costs. Each of these 
sanctions effectively imposes some monetary loss on the corporation.203 
Accordingly, the direct sanctions can be replicated by civil liability.204 
Stigma, or the reputational cost of criminal liability, is a less direct, 
but equally real, sanction. The reputational loss associated with the 
imposition of criminal liability may be what distinguishes criminal from 
civil liability for corporations.205  
Khanna argues that the unique reputational impact of criminal 
liability cannot justify the imposition of criminal liability as opposed to 
civil liability.206 According to Khanna, reputational effect for a 
corporation can be monetized and thus handled equally well, if not 
better, by the imposition of a fine.207 Khanna describes the problem of 
calculating the value of a reputational impact ex ante.208 The reputational 
impact is imprecise and unpredictable.209 As a result, where the goal is 
 
 200. Indirect sanctions, such as reputational costs, are addressed below. See infra text 
accompanying notes 205–221. 
 201. See supra text accompanying notes 177–179. 
 202. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provide that in certain extreme cases “the fine shall be set at 
an amount (subject to the statutory maximum) sufficient to divest the organization of all its net 
assets.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8C1.1 (2011). 
 203. The distinction between a fine and these other sanctions may simply be in the calculability of 
the loss. Whereas a fine of $500,000 due immediately carries a value to the corporation of $500,000, 
the actual cost of debarment may be difficult to calculate ex ante as it will likely turn on unknown facts 
about the future conduct of corporate actors, corporate customers, corporate competitors, and 
markets generally. 
 204. See Khanna, supra note 22, at 1499 (“[Legally imposed criminal] sanctions are or can easily be 
made available in corporate civil liability regimes.”). 
 205. Id. at 1497 (“The arguably unique sanctioning characteristic of criminal liability is the criminal 
sanction’s potentially stigmatizing effect.”); see also Buell, supra note 28, at 500 (“[I]mposing entity 
criminal liability may inflict reputational harm at the level of the institution and . . . reputational 
effects are likely to flow through to institutional members in ways that deter wrongdoing and 
encourage compliance efforts.”). 
 206. Khanna, supra note 22, at 1511 (“[C]riminal reputational sanctions are probably not superior 
to civil reputational sanctions.”). 
 207. Id. at 1504 (“[W]e should prefer cash fines over reputational sanctions as long as the 
corporation is not judgment-proof.”). Khanna arrives at this conclusion after describing the significant 
costs of reputational sanctions that are not present with fines (including the facts that the value of a 
fine is recouped by the collecting entity, while the value of reputation is a net loss to society, and that 
reputational sanctions are imprecise and are thus likely to result in over- or under-deterrence). Id. 
 208. Id. at 1504 (“Inquiring into the impact of a reputational penalty on corporate sales and the 
impact of corporate mitigation efforts could prove very costly because reputational penalties may be 
subject to considerable uncertainty.”). 
 209. Id. 
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achieving the optimal sanction to deter crime, we should not rely on 
reputational harm.210 
Samuel Buell argues otherwise.211 He describes the significant 
impact of reputational harm associated with corporate criminal liability212 
and argues that it cannot be replicated by a civil fine.213 And, whereas 
Khanna concentrates on the difficulty of predicting reputational harm ex 
ante, Buell is more troubled by the problem of calculating the optimal 
sanction ex ante: What “if we cannot fully determine ex ante, as an 
empirical matter, the quantity of sanction that will succeed in deterring 
misconduct in firms or, indeed, the amount of misconduct in firms that is 
acceptable because further deterrence would be too costly?”214 Because 
we cannot determine the optimal sanction ex ante, Buell invokes the 
unpredictability of reputational impact as a benefit that cannot be 
replicated by civil fines.215 The reputational impact of criminal conviction 
serves as “a more decentralized regulatory approach, relying on social 
assessment of the seriousness and costs of wrongdoing in firms.”216 
Khanna begins with the assumption that there is a calculable, 
optimal deterrence model and concludes that it can be set by civil 
penalties in most cases. Buell begins with the assumption that we cannot 
determine the optimal deterrence model and therefore sanctions are 
properly set according to the public marketplace of reputational 
sanctions. Both positions suffer from the same problem: lack of ex ante 
information. 
Skepticism about the possibility of calculating optimal sanctions is 
warranted. It is not possible to imagine the scope of all possible 
corporate criminal wrongdoing and the value thereof to all possible 
corporations. Fines will likely under- or over-deter.217 
But it is then a leap to conclude, as does Buell, that because we 
cannot know the optimal sanction ex ante, reputational impact will be 
appropriately matched to the harm. It is true that reputational impact is 
imprecise, difficult to predict, and stems from the marketplace of ideas. It 
is also true that we cannot calculate the optimal sanction in advance. But 
 
 210. See id. at 1512 (“We should not therefore rely on corporate criminal reputational penalties 
and reliance on any corporate reputational penalty should be minimal.”). 
 211. Buell, supra note 28, at 500. 
 212. Id. at 504–07. 
 213. Id. at 512–16 (disputing Khanna’s contention that cash fines might replace reputational 
harms). 
 214. Id. at 514. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Indeed, to the extent corporations value a type of crime that benefits the corporation 
differently, any set fine would likely under-deter and over-deter at the same time with regard to 
different corporations. 
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that we have two unknowns does not allow us to conclude that they will 
match. 
Indeed, there is reason to doubt that reputational impact will be 
matched to the harm in many cases.218 Different corporations value their 
own reputations differently, and a corporation’s reputation is 
multifaceted. A pharmaceutical company might highly value its 
reputation for scientific advances and quality control. That same 
company might not highly value its reputation for compliance with 
environmental regulations if it concluded that its environmental record 
was unlikely to influence customers and contractors one way or 
another.219 On the other hand, an oil company might have greater 
concern about its environmental reputation.220 
The imprecision inherent in reputational sanctions undermines their 
utility in controlling corporate crime. The deterrent effect of reputational 
costs associated with criminal violation of environmental laws would vary 
between the pharmaceutical company and the oil company, but there is 
no reason to suppose society places similarly disparate value on 
preventing each type of company from polluting the groundwater. The 
community whose water is polluted does not care much whether it was 
done by Big Pharma or by Big Oil; we would like to discourage both 
equally, and reputational sanctions are unlikely to do so. 
Reputational sanctions are a distinctive element of criminal 
liability.221 In any one case, the harm to a corporation’s reputation has a 
monetary value to that corporation. As a result of the imprecision and 
lack of uniformity in reputational harm, however, this impact is not a 
 
 218. Coffee, supra note 81, at 427 (“Adverse publicity is something of a loose cannon; its exact 
impact cannot be reliably estimated nor is it controllable so that only the guilty are affected.”). 
 219. Such a company would be more concerned with the reputational impact of a finding of flaws 
in its production process than with a finding of illegal waste water dumping. At the pharmacy, 
customers are worried about getting safe and effective medicine; external and circumstantial harms to 
the environment may not figure so prominently in their mind at the moment of purchase. 
 220. So, for example, in 2000, then “British Petroleum,” “at a cost of $200 million, . . . began an 
enormous corporate rebranding exercise, shortening its name from British Petroleum to BP, coining 
the slogan ‘Beyond Petroleum’ and redesigning its corporate insignia.” See Darcy Frey, How Green Is 
BP?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 2002, at 99–100. Presumably such decisions reflected (at least in part) a belief 
that consumers might make purchasing decisions (gas for cars) with some thought to the environmental 
reputation of the oil company. 
 221. Michael Block and others have argued that the reputational harm associated with criminal 
liability for corporations is not materially different from that associated with civil liability. Michael K. 
Block, Optimal Penalties, Criminal Law and the Control of Corporate Behavior, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 395, 
415 (1991) (“[T]he market effect of the initial announcement of FAA fines assessed for safety 
violations is very similar in magnitude to the effects of being charged or convicted of fraud.”). Buell 
reviews this and other similar studies, notes the small sample sizes and other limitations of the studies, 
and concludes that the conclusions seem “doubtful.” See Buell, supra note 28, at 508–10. I tend to 
agree with Buell. Additionally, the lack of uniformity between different corporate reputations suggests 
another reason to be skeptical about a singular assessment of the value of a criminal versus a civil 
violation. 
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strong justification for imposing criminal liability on corporations 
generally (although it may be for a particular type of crime in a particular 
industry). 
b. Enhanced Procedural Protections 
Criminal litigation provides the defendant with enhanced 
procedural protections.222 Could these be the basis for preferring criminal 
liability over civil liability for corporations? Khanna specifically 
considers the higher standard of proof,223 the prohibition against double 
jeopardy,224 the right to a jury trial,225 and the requirement of grand jury 
indictment.226 These generally exist for the purpose of avoiding false 
convictions even at the cost of increased false acquittals.227 To the extent 
the concern about false convictions is considerably diminished with 
respect to corporations,228 these procedural protections serve less purpose 
than in individual prosecutions. 
Additionally, each of the procedural protections accompanying a 
criminal action renders (to greater and lesser degrees) enforcement 
against corporations more costly.229 These procedural protections are 
generally available to individuals because we prefer wrongful acquittals 
to wrongful convictions.230 To the extent that preference is diminished 
with regard to corporations, so too is the value of enhanced procedural 
protections diminished. Khanna concludes that the value is diminished 
sufficiently that, in most cases, their costs cannot be justified.231 
But protecting against false convictions is not the only function of 
enhanced procedural protections for criminal defendants. While many 
note that the enhanced procedural protections are necessary because of 
the heightened jeopardy faced by a criminal defendant,232 it is less 
 
 222. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I view the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental 
value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty 
man go free.”). 
 223. See Khanna, supra note 22, at 1512. 
 224. See id. at 1517. 
 225. See id. at 1518. 
 226. See id. at 1519. 
 227. See id. at 1512–20. 
 228. See supra text accompanying notes 156–170. Khanna too concludes this concern is diminished: 
“Although there may be many good reasons to offer these protections to individuals, false convictions 
of corporations are not as problematic to society as false convictions of individuals.” Khanna, supra 
note 22, at 1512.  
 229. See id. at 1512–20. 
 230. See Gilchrist, supra note 144, at 149–53. 
 231. See Khanna, supra note 22, at 1520 (“In sum, criminal procedural protections are rarely 
desirable for corporate defendants.”). 
 232. See Susan R. Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-Civil Boundary, 2 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 679, 680 
(1999) (“Because both the stigma from being labeled a ‘felon’ and the harm suffered by the defendant 
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commonly observed that this is a two-way street.233 Just as the enhanced 
procedural protections guard against wrongful assignment of the stigma 
of criminal conviction, so too do they preserve the meaning of that 
stigma. The person condemning or blaming the convicted may do so 
confidently, comforted by procedural protections that guarded against 
erroneous conviction.234 Procedural protections not only protect the 
innocent, they preserve the meaningfulness of convictions and hence the 
reputational impact accompanying a conviction. 
As discussed in the preceding Subpart, however, it would be difficult 
to justify criminal liability for corporations on the basis of reputational 
impact. There is too much variability in this particular sanction, and 
there is little reason to think that variability is linked to the harm the law 
seeks to prevent. Therefore, while the procedural protections unique to 
criminal law serve a function even with regard to corporations, they too 
are not the basis on which to justify criminal liability over civil liability 
for corporations. 
c. More Powerful Enforcement Devices 
Generally the tools of criminal law enforcement are broader and 
more powerful than those of civil agencies. Khanna compares civil 
investigative demand powers—such as those wielded by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission or the DOJ’s Antitrust Division—to grand 
jury investigative powers in the criminal realm.235 He concludes that, “in 
terms of information gathering at the prelitigation stage, public civil 
enforcement provides powers virtually identical to those provided by 
public criminal enforcement.”236 This conclusion is perhaps premature, 
though not necessarily wrong as a result. Civil enforcement agencies do 
lack tools—such as wiretaps, search warrants and custodial interviews—
 
from the punitive sanction is so great, the federal Constitution grants a criminal defendant a vast array 
of procedural protections not afforded a defendant in a civil action.”); Stephen J. Morse, Blame and 
Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 113, 121 (1996) (“Civil commitment does 
not require the same procedural protections as criminal incarceration because the detention is not 
punishment and does not carry the same stigma.”); Frank J. Vandall, The Criminalization of Products 
Liability: An Invitation to Political Abuse, Preemption, and Non-Enforcement, 57 Cath. U. L. Rev. 
341, 355 (2008) (“[T]he stigma associated with imprisonment, as distinguished from the payment of 
damages, is a significant justification for the greater procedural protections available to criminal 
defendants.”). 
 233. Buell, supra note 28, at 516 (“The more the criminal proceeding is stripped of its special 
procedural characteristics, the less meaning the reputational sanction will carry.”). 
 234. This is a solely descriptive statement. There are real reasons to question whether the 
confidence in the procedural protections is justified. See William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of 
American Criminal Justice 227–36 (2011). One might also question whether there is a normative 
value of condemning another person. But see Moore, supra note 33, at 138–52 (1997) (arguing that 
there is a normative value to assigning blame). I am not addressing these questions.  
 235. Khanna, supra note 22, at 1522–24. 
 236. Id. at 1524. 
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that are available in criminal enforcement. Still, if the best defense of 
criminal liability for corporations is that it expands the scope of 
investigative methods, that would be a very weak defense. No one has 
argued that individual criminal liability should be abandoned for those 
corporate agents that cause the wrongdoing.237 The question is whether 
the imposition of criminal liability on corporations found to have 
committed wrongdoing can be justified. Any investigative techniques and 
tools available only in criminal law enforcement would remain available 
for investigating the role of individuals regardless of whether 
corporations qua corporations remain subject to criminal liability. 
Therefore, corporate criminal liability cannot be defended on the basis 
that by virtue of being criminalized the wrongdoing is easier to detect.238 
d. Message-Sending Role 
Khanna concedes that “[o]ne function of the criminal law is to shape 
preferences and convey society’s condemnation of certain types of 
behavior. Thus, criminal liability may be warranted simply because 
criminal liability is a valuable mode of communication to society.”239 He 
then rejects this possibility.240 Khanna suggests that other means of 
communication, “such as news conferences, corporate civil liability, and 
managerial criminal liability, [can] accomplish this end.”241 This is 
Khanna’s most troubling conclusion. While it is undoubtedly true that 
there are various ways a government can communicate society’s 
condemnation of certain types of behavior, it is not at all obvious that all 
means are equally effective.242 Perhaps criminal liability serves as a 
 
 237. Khanna concludes that a combination of corporate civil liability and individual criminal 
liability would best serve the purposes of deterrence. See id. at 1532. 
 238. This conclusion follows even accounting for the significant incentive corporations have to 
cooperate with criminal investigations and the fact that compelling cooperation and investigations of 
corporations by corporations is one of the strongest law enforcement tools in the world of white-collar 
crime. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis 
of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 687, 696 (1997); Miriam Hechler Baer, 
Cooperation’s Cost, 88 Wash. U. L. Rev. 903, 920–24 (2011) (describing the manner in which inducing 
cooperation from corporations increases detection and deterrence). The conclusion that enhanced law 
enforcement does not itself justify criminal liability for corporations is correct because the ability to 
induce cooperation is not limited to the criminal realm. The power of inducement might be 
particularly strong because of the strength of direct sanctions attached to criminal liability, but there is 
nothing about those sanctions (aside from reputational sanctions), that cannot be replicated in a civil 
action. See supra text accompanying notes 197–202; see also Khanna, supra note 22, at 1526.  
 239. Khanna, supra note 22, at 1531. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models—
And What Can Be Done About It, 101 Yale L.J. 1875, 1876 (1992) (“[E]ven if the civil law could 
provide equivalent deterrence, it may not be able to perform as successfully the socializing and 
educative roles that the criminal law performs in our society.”). 
Gilchrist_20 (S. ALESSI) (Do Not Delete) 12/19/2012 2:54 PM 
42 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:101 
 
particularly effective form of communication.243 This idea is further 
explored in the next Part. 
It is worth noting that Khanna hypothesizes that communication 
through corporate criminal liability may be counterproductive as 
“citizens might find imposing criminal liability on fictional entities 
farcical, and this response may decrease the criminal label’s effect for 
other types of crimes.”244 As will be further discussed below, the concern 
about diluting the impact of criminal liability is real, but there is hardly a 
real worry that there is a widespread view that criminalizing corporate 
conduct is farcical. There are strong views about that in the academy, but 
those views are generally offered as a tonic against the prevailing popular 
view that corporate conduct should be subject to criminal liability. At 
least presently, I see little reason to worry about diluting respect for the 
criminal justice system by allowing criminal liability to attach to 
corporations.245 
In sum, Khanna’s analysis of the four distinguishing characteristics 
of criminal law is compelling and seems largely right246—until he gets to 
the message-sending role of criminal sanctions, which he seems to discount 
too quickly. In the next Part I examine the consequential value of 
expressivism in criminal liability and suggest this consequentially valued 
expression might justify criminal over civil liability for corporations. 
III.  The Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity Justifies Imposing 
Criminal Liability for Corporations 
A. Criminal Liability Has a Distinctive Expressive Aspect 
Criminal liability is distinguished from civil liability by the stigma 
that accompanies it. The imposition of criminal liability conveys an 
expression of condemnation lacking in civil liability.247 A tortfeasor owes 
money, but should not necessarily feel shame over the tort.248 A finding 
 
 243. He instead concentrates on the lack of consensus about when and what messages need to be 
sent. Khanna, supra note 22, at 1531–32.  
 244. Id. at 1531. 
 245. To the contrary, I think just the opposite is true. See infra text accompanying notes 304–307. 
 246. Coffee has identified additional “political, pragmatic and institutional” reasons to favor 
criminal over civil liability. Coffee, supra note 81, at 448. Namely, criminal dockets tend to move more 
quickly than civil dockets, and there presently exists a “great infrastructure of criminal law enforcers,” 
unmatched in the civil realm. Id. at 447. As Professor Coffee recognizes, however, these are 
circumstantial aspects of the legal system that could be changed.  
 247. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Probs. 401, 405 
(1958) (“[Crime] is conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place, will incur a formal and solemn 
pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community.”). 
 248. Of course, those found civilly liable may in fact feel shame or other feelings more consonant 
with receiving the moral opprobrium of society. This might be true, for example, in a professional 
malpractice case. The professional found to have committed malpractice is unlikely to view the 
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of criminality, on the other hand, carries a stamp of opprobrium as part 
and parcel of the finding.249 
The source of the expressive aspect of criminal liability can be found 
in what Hart described as the “internal aspect of rules.”250 The internal 
aspect of rules is that which causes people subject to the rules to accept 
an obligation to act in accordance with the rules.251 There is an internal 
aspect to the legal system. Hart does not contend that everyone subject 
to a law adopts the internal view,252 but in a “reasonably just society” 
most people value obeying the law for its own sake.253 This obligation is 
entirely independent of any penalty for failing to do so.254 The internal 
 
liability as of mere monetary consequence. The distinction between criminal and civil in such cases 
may be not so much a distinction of consequences as a distinction between the formally intended 
consequences. A finding of criminal liability is meant to stand as a moral condemnation of sorts; on 
the other hand, a finding of civil liability is meant to identify who should bear the cost of an act that, 
while not celebrated, is not morally condemned.  
 249. The distinction between crime and tort is fuzzy and there may be findings of criminality that 
carry no moral condemnation. Because a legislature may decide what conduct to criminalize, there is 
no mechanism to ensure only that meriting moral condemnation is criminalized. But the central 
examples of criminal liability can be distinguished from the central examples of civil liability on the 
basis of the relative moral condemnation associated with each. And it ought to be so. “[C]riminal law 
works best when it deals with conduct of the defendant that the law thinks worthy of moral 
condemnation, and . . . it works worst when in the name of effective social control it modifies its 
standards by judging actors at their peril.” Richard A. Epstein, Crime and Tort: Old Wine in Old 
Bottles, in Assessing the Criminal: Restitution, Retribution, and the Legal Process 231, 248 
(Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel III eds., 1977).  
 250. See Hart, supra note 29, at 56–57. 
 251. Id. at 56–57. 
What the external point of view, which limits itself to the observable regularities of 
behaviour, cannot reproduce is the way in which the rules function as rules in the lives of 
those who normally are the majority of society. These are the officials, lawyers, or private 
persons who use them, in one situation after another, as guides to the conduct of social life, 
as the basis for claims, demands, admissions, criticism, or punishment, viz., in all the familiar 
transactions of life according to rules. For them the violation of a rule is not merely a basis 
for the prediction that a hostile reaction will follow but a reason for hostility. 
Id. at 90 (emphasis added). 
 252. Id. at 115–16 (“[A person] obeying a rule . . . need not, though he may, share the internal 
point of view accepting the rules as standards for all to whom they apply.”). “But this merely personal 
concern with the rules, which is all the ordinary citizen may have in obeying them, cannot characterize 
the attitude of the courts to the rules with which they operate as courts.” Id. 
 253. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, The Intrinsic Value of Obeying a Law: Economic Analysis of the 
Internal Viewpoint, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1275, 1277 (2006) (“In a reasonably just society, most people 
prefer to obey most laws, and some people are indifferent towards obeying some laws.”). 
 254. See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Obligations and the Internal Aspect of Rules, 75 Fordham 
L. Rev. 1229 (2006).  
Is it essential to legal obligations that their violation is attended by sanction? The answer, 
for Hart, was “no,” but a doubly qualified no. In the first instance, having a sanction 
attached to noncompliance is not part of what it is for there to be a legal obligation. The 
concept of legal obligation is cashed out by reference to the injunctive force of a valid 
primary rule of conduct. Such a rule does not depend for its existence on a sanction.  
Id. at 1242. 
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aspect of rules is at odds with Holmes’ famous description of law as 
purely sanction-based and devoid of moral obligation:255  
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a 
bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such 
knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his 
reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the 
vaguer sanctions of conscience.256 
The internal aspect of rules suggests otherwise: Laws do not merely 
price, they obligate. 
It should be noted that some laws do—at least arguably—merely 
price. These laws too, however, have an internal aspect. For example, 
some argue that rules of tort impose an obligation not to violate the 
rule.257 Yet I introduced this Section with the observation that criminal 
law obligates in a way other laws—like tort laws—do not. There remains 
something different between the obligation established by criminal law 
and that established by tort law. This distinction is most clear where tort 
law is understood as merely establishing a pricing system for certain 
conduct and certain results.258 Both the obligation and pricing views of 
tort law are consistent with the fact that tort law has an internal aspect. 
In the case of tort as obligation, the internal aspect is obvious. The tort-
as-obligation understanding would express the rules as “Do not do X; 
violation of this rule will be penalized by Y.” The internal aspect of this 
rule is that those subject to the rule accept an internal obligation to “not 
do X.” On the other hand, if the rules of tort law merely set prices, the 
rule can best be expressed as “Doing X will result in Y.” In this case 
there remains an internal aspect to the rules—not that there is an 
obligation to not do X, rather, there is an obligation to pay Y if you do X. 
The expression of the rule changes, and the expression of the internal 
aspect of the rule changes accordingly, but either way the rule contains 
 
 255. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 462 (1897) (“The duty to 
keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—
and nothing else.”). 
 256. Id. at 459. 
 257. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of 
View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1563, 1576 (2006) (“If tort law were 
really, as Holmesians support, a regulatory scheme for deterring and compensating, the traditional 
vocabulary and syntax of tort ought to have developed quite differently than it did.”). 
 258. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender 
Offers, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 1155 (1982).  
[M]anagers do not have an ethical duty to obey economic regulatory laws just because the 
laws exist. They must determine the importance of these laws. The penalties Congress 
names for disobedience are a measure of how much it wants firms to sacrifice in order to 
adhere to the rules; the idea of optimal sanctions is based on the supposition that managers 
not only may but also should violate the rules when it is profitable to do so. 
Id. at 1177 n.57. Notably, Easterbrook and Fischel in making this claim expressly “put to one side laws 
concerning violence or other acts thought to be malum in se.” Id. at 1168 n.36. 
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an internal aspect.259 The debate between those who see tort rules as 
obligations and those who view tort rules as pricing is not about the 
presence or absence of an independent obligation to comply with the 
command of the law; rather, it is a debate about what the law commands. 
Either way, there is an obligation to comply with the command, however 
it is understood. 
In the context of criminal law, however, the internal aspect of the 
law is simpler and more obvious. Substantive criminal law is not a pricing 
system; it is a set of commands and prohibitions.260 Compared with civil 
liability, criminal liability is more difficult to impose—the defendant is 
afforded more significant procedural protections—the reason for this is 
at least in significant part because criminal liability carries a greater 
stigma than civil liability.261 Depending on how one understands the 
mandate of civil laws (obligation creating or pricing), it may be too 
strong to say that criminal liability carries a kind of opprobrium that civil 
liability lacks.262 It may merely carry a heightened degree of opprobrium 
compared to civil liability. But whether the distinction is one of degree or 
kind, there is a distinction between the opprobrium associated with a 
violation of criminal law and that associated with a violation of civil 
law.263 
 
 259. Similarly, contract law might be understood to promote efficient breach. In that case, the 
substantive law of contract might be understood to impose an obligation: “Breaching the contract will 
result in Z.” Or, it might be understood to protect promises. In that case, the substantive law of 
contract might be understood to impose an obligation: “Do not breach a contract; violation of this rule 
will be penalized by Z.” There is an internal aspect to both rules. 
 260. See Coffee, supra note 242, at 1876 (“The difference between a price and a sanction is at 
bottom the difference between, on one hand, a tax that brings private and public costs into balance by 
forcing the actor to internalize costs that the actor’s conduct imposes on others and, on the other, a 
significantly discontinuous increase in the expected cost of the behavior that is intended to dissuade 
the actor from engaging in the activity at all.”).  
 261. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (“The accused during a criminal prosecution has at 
stake interest of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon 
conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction.”). 
 262. Of course, if there is any context in which Holmes’ understanding of law as purely sanction-
based is correct, it would be with regard to large corporations. Holmes’ bad man may be a particularly 
apt description of corporations. “[I]s not the perspective of a large bureaucratic corporation whose 
sole or primary aim is maximization of profit very close to that of the ‘bad man’—amoral, rational, 
calculating, purposeful, pursuing its own agenda?” William Twining, Other People’s Power: The Bad 
Man and English Positivism 1897–1997, 63 Brook. L. Rev. 189, 210 (1997); see Jill E. Fisch, The Bad 
Man Goes to Washington: The Effect of Political Influence on Corporate Duty, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 
1593, 1600 (2006) (quoting Twining and concluding that “the bad man, with his nonexistent moral 
compass, offers us a mechanism for understanding the duties imposed on amoral corporations by the 
law”). 
 263. One problem with understanding civil laws as obligation-creating as opposed to pricing rules, 
is that doing so undermines the distinctively prohibitive character of criminal law. See Coffee, supra 
note 242, at 1877 (reviewing non-deterrent functions of criminal law that would be undermined were a 
separation between civil and criminal law not maintained).  
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Strong opprobrium is part of the punishment, and part of what 
makes the punishment criminal.264 Criminal sanctions contain an 
expressive element lacking in civil liability. Could this be the aspect of 
criminal liability that justifies its application to corporations? Peter 
Henning argues it may be: “As an expression of the community’s moral 
judgment, there is a significant value to applying the criminal law to 
organizations that act through their agents, apart from any instrumental 
benefits from having a coercive means available to deter certain 
conduct.”265 In the following Subparts, I consider the benefits of that 
expression of judgment and whether they can justify corporate criminal 
liability. 
B. The Expressive Aspect of Criminal Liability Cannot Be Valued 
for Its Own Sake 
The fact that criminal liability is accompanied by moral 
condemnation does not establish that condemnation is beneficial. 
Expressivism is not a good in and of itself. 
Many theorists have rightly attacked expressivism to the extent it is 
offered as its own good. Hart described a “denunciatory theory of 
punishment.”266 He rejected the theory by challenging the very value of 
expressing condemnation: It may be a fact, but is it good?267 
 
 264. As Dan Kahan describes: 
The expressive theory of punishment says we can’t identify criminal wrongdoing and 
punishment independently of their social meanings. Economic competition may impoverish 
a merchant every bit as much as theft. The reason that theft but not competition is viewed 
as wrongful, on this account, is that against the background of social norms theft expresses 
disrespect for the injured party’s moral worth whereas competition (at least ordinarily) does 
not. Military service and imprisonment may be equally destructive of a person’s liberty; the 
reason that imprisonment but not conscription is regarded as punishment is that against the 
background of norms only imprisonment expresses society’s moral condemnation. 
Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 413, 420 (1999). Similarly, Joel 
Feinberg distinguishes civil penalties from criminal punishment in this way: 
[P]enalties have a miscellaneous character, whereas punishments have an important 
additional characteristic in common. That characteristic, or specific difference, I shall argue, 
is a certain expressive function: punishment is a conventional device for the expression of 
attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, 
on the part either of the punishing authority himself or of those “in whose name” the 
punishment is inflicted. Punishment, in short, has a symbolic significance largely missing 
from other kinds of penalties. 
Feinberg, supra note 27, at 98. 
 265. Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for Rehabilitation, 46 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 1417, 1427 (2009). 
 266. See Hart, supra note 147, at 170 (defining the theory as positing that “the ultimate 
justification of any punishment is not that it is a deterrent, but that it is the emphatic denunciation by 
the community of a crime”). This theory is distinguished from what this Article describes as the 
expressive value of punishment in that it posits that moral expression is the primary and perhaps sole 
justification for punishment. Id. This Article makes no such claim; rather, this Article contends that 
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Surely to think of the apt expression of feeling—even if we call it moral 
indignation rather than revenge—as the ultimate justification of 
punishment is to subordinate what is primary to what is ancillary. We 
do not live in society in order to condemn, though we may condemn in 
order to live.268 
Condemnation is not an end; it is a means. Al Alschuler lampoons the 
contrary position: “[I]mposing punishment expresses a community’s 
values and feels really good. The society that slays together stays 
together.”269 
If the expressive value of punishment could be justified no further 
than expression-for-expression’s-sake—or that it feels good—it would be 
inadequate to justify the imposition of criminal liability.270 After all, 
criminal liability is inherently serious. It is serious for those shareholders 
who lose money.271 It is serious for those employees whose jobs might be 
jeopardized.272 It is serious for the managers who, even when they avoid 
personal criminal liability, may be subject to remedial actions affecting 
pay, reporting structures, and responsibilities. And these consequences 
are only those affiliated with any imposition of liability—criminal or civil. 
Beyond that, the point embraced by this Article is that there is 
something distinctively severe about criminal liability. The expression 
itself imposes a burden on all affiliated with the corporation.273 The 
severe consequences of criminal liability for a corporation and all its 
affiliates cannot be justified except by reference to something more 
 
there is a consequentialist value to expression in criminal liability, and that value helps explain why 
criminal liability is appropriate even where—as with corporations—imposition of civil liability may 
generate sufficient deterrence at lower cost.  
 267. Id. at 170–72 (Hart rejected the theory for three reasons; only the third is relevant here). 
 268. Id. at 172. 
 269. See Alschuler, supra note 21, at 1373 n.81. 
  270. I address these and other issues in Condemnation Without Basis: An Expressive Failure of 
Corporate Prosecutions, 64 Hastings L.J. (forthcoming 2013). 
 271. See Coffee, supra note 81, at 401. 
 272. See id. 
 273. This point should not be overstated. As described above with regard to reputational effects, 
the expression of condemnation associated with criminal liability can vary widely depending on the 
substantive crime at issue and the nature of the corporation. It can affect different corporate affiliates 
differently as well. Thus, a U.S.-based medical researcher at a pharmaceutical company likely feels 
very little of the condemnation stemming from the company’s technical violation of foreign anti-
corruption laws. But, as the condemnation becomes more severe, one would expect more corporate 
affiliates to feel its impact. For example, although not related to criminal allegations, the 
condemnation toward AIG following its bailout was so severe that employees who had nothing to do 
with the financial problems or the controversial bonuses reported feeling its impact. See Russell 
Goldman & Ann-Marie Dorning, Employees Fear for Their Lives: The Other AIG Outrage, 
ABCNews, Mar. 27, 2009, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=7184097&page=1 
(“Employees of American International Group not involved with the shady credit default swaps that 
led to the company’s near-collapse last year are angry for being unfairly blamed for a mess they say 
they had nothing to do with and are scared by threats of violence against them and their families.”). 
Gilchrist_20 (S. ALESSI) (Do Not Delete) 12/19/2012 2:54 PM 
48 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:101 
 
serious than making people feel good. It must be consequentially 
justified. 
C. The Expressive Aspect of Criminal Liability Has Consequential 
Value 
Corporations can act, and fail to act, qua corporations, in ways that 
merit condemnation.274 The culture of a corporation as a whole can give 
rise to meaningful judgment of that corporation.275 Punishment as an 
expression of that judgment could serve any number of goals.276 Of 
course, in describing the value of expressivism as something distinct from 
deterrence, it is important to maintain a clear distinction between the 
two functions. The impact of criminal liability on a corporation’s 
reputation may have a deterrent effect, and it may stem from a societal 
judgment against the corporation; however, expressivism is distinct from 
deterrence. Expressivism values the expression of condemnation for its 
consequential benefits apart from any deterrent effect it may have on the 
corporation.277 
There are two functions of expressive punishment—independent of 
any deterrent effect—that are useful. First, the expression of 
condemnation can influence the values of a society. Second, the failure to 
express condemnation through the imposition of criminal liability, where 
such condemnation is widespread, undermines the legitimacy of the 
criminal justice system.  
1. The Consequential Value of Expression in Corporate Criminal 
Liability 
Criminal liability carries its own normative punch. The power of 
criminal liability to influence normative beliefs is predicated on the fact 
that every criminal sanction carries some normative value related only to 
 
 274. See supra Part I. 
 275. See supra text accompanying notes 70–74. 
 276. Heidi Hurd and Michael Moore suggest this list: 
Thus, a utilitarian might plausibly suppose that the denunciation of crimes, criminals, their 
motives, etc., will (1) vent a society’s vengeful emotions in a way that prevents some 
members of that society from taking the law into their own hands, (2) reinforce the values of 
law-abiding citizens in a way that keeps them law-abiding, (3) shame others who are less 
law-abiding out of breaking the law, (4) educate the populace in the principles of morality 
that keep most people from being harmed by others, (5) satisfy what most people most 
want, (6) maintain a sense of social cohesion by giving members of society an identity 
defined by a set of shared values, etc. 
Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Punishing Hatred and Prejudice, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1081, 1111 (2004).  
 277. The deterrent effect of reputational impact on the corporation can be real, but it is too 
imprecise and sometimes too disconnected from the harm to be prevented to serve as a strong 
justification for imposition of criminal liability. See supra text accompanying notes 205–221.  
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its status as a crime (as opposed to whatever normative value 
accompanies the substantive conduct proscribed). That is to say, there 
are two reasons criminal liability is accompanied by condemnation. First, 
the substantive law is what it is often because of some measure of societal 
belief that the proscribed conduct is morally wrong; this might be 
thought of as the substantive prong of moral condemnation affiliated 
with criminal liability. Where one is found to have engaged in the 
proscribed conduct, one is subject to whatever moral judgment—if any—
caused the substantive law to be enacted in the first place. 
Then there is a procedural prong to the moral condemnation 
affiliated with criminal liability: This is the internal aspect of rules.278 
People subject to the rule accept an obligation to act in accordance with 
the rule simply by virtue of it being the rule.279 Failure to do so is 
judged—independent of any judgment regarding the substantive 
conduct—as a failure to comply with the accepted obligation. A finding 
of criminal liability is a formal declaration that the guilty party violated 
the criminal law, and this carries independent judgment.280 
This type of judgment—for failing to follow the law—imparts to 
criminal laws an authority unrelated to the underlying morality or 
normative judgments that caused the law to be enacted. The internal 
aspect of criminal laws is particularly strong because substantive criminal 
rules are recognized as clear prohibitions in a way civil rules are not.281 As 
a result, criminal law can shift societal norms.282 A particular act might be 
subject to little or no moral judgment; however, where that act is 
prohibited by criminal law, the commission of the act carries at least the 
opprobrium associated with violating the obligation to obey the law. 
Because criminal laws have this normative component, they have the 
potential effect of shifting social norms over time.283 
 
 278. See supra text accompanying notes 250–258. 
 279. See supra Part III.A. 
 280. The severity of this pronouncement for individuals can be seen in the use of the label “felon.” 
One who is convicted of a felony is not merely convicted, she is formally—and nearly permanently—
labeled a felon. That label carries severe social and legal consequences. See George P. Fletcher, 
Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the Racial Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1895, 
1906–07 (1999) (identifying various consequences of being a felon).  
 281. See supra text accompanying notes 260–264. 
 282. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a 
Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 Duke L.J. 1, 17 (1990) (identifying shaping preferences as an 
important, if frequently ignored, purpose of criminal punishment). 
 283. For an example of corporate criminal law that might have affected public morality one might 
consider enhanced enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The dramatic increase in 
enforcement since 2000 seems to have been accompanied by some shift among corporate personnel 
about the moral status of bribing foreign officials. A 2007 survey of senior corporate executives 
conducted by the Economist Intelligence Unit found over 65% of respondents “believe a level playing 
field is crucial to their company’s future business activities.” See PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra 
note 66, at 2, 36. Environmental laws may be another area where increased enforcement has shifted 
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That the normative value of criminal law can be harnessed to 
influence society’s values284 in specific contexts seems uncontroversial.285 
However, difficult questions remain: How strong is law’s normative 
harness and how heavy are society’s moral views? The answer, no doubt, 
is highly variable between types of crimes, norms, societies, and legal 
systems.286 But even recognizing that the capacity of criminal law to shift 
societal norms is limited, it is nonetheless a function unique287 to criminal 
law, and thus a function that might help explain one consequential 
benefit of expression through the imposition of criminal liability on 
corporations: It influences what society will and will not accept in terms 
of corporate conduct.288 
2. The Consequential Cost of Expression in Corporate Criminal 
Immunity 
The expressive value of criminal liability has a still more profound 
effect: It prevents too great a disparity between legal standards and social 
norms. Imposition of criminal liability expresses condemnation; where 
that expression deviates too far from social norms, it does so at a cost to 
the legitimacy of the legal system. This is what I consider to be the 
restraining effect of expressivism. Generally, the expressive value of 
punishment serves to “strengthen faith in rule of law among the general 
public.”289 Expressivism can serve as a harness to gently and slowly pull 
social norms.290 But it is a weak harness against generally heavy norms. 
The real power of expressivism is a limiting power: Criminal liability can 
stretch beyond that which is contrary to social norms only so far; at some 
 
societal norms. 
 284. Again, of course there is a plurality of opinions and lack of pure moral consensus. This Article 
maintains that we can still meaningfully talk about moral views prevalent in a society (for example, 
murder is wrong) while recognizing even wide-spread disagreement at the margins (for example, 
physician-assisted suicide is . . . .). 
 285. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal 
Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 29 (2007) (“The criminal justice system, as an institution 
involving legislatures, legal philosophers, various criminological experts, and enforcement agencies, 
also has the power to persuade citizens about the moral appropriateness of its enacted laws.”); see also 
Jeffrey A. Meyer, Authentically Innocent: Juries and Federal Regulatory Crimes, 59 Hastings L.J. 137, 
190 (2007) (pointing to “campaigns to prosecute ‘dead-beat dads’ or drunk drivers” as examples of the 
use of criminal law to shift societal norms).  
 286. The perception of procedural fairness of a particular legal system is one of the factors that 
would likely influence the strength of bond between the declarations of the criminal justice system and 
the values of the people. See Tyler, supra note 30 (arguing that evaluations of relative procedural 
fairness have an impact on respect for the authority of a legal system). 
 287. Or, at least uniquely strong. See supra text accompanying note 260. 
 288. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 282, at 37 (“Criminal law is viewed as part of an overall social 
process of shaping peoples’ preferences to conform to established social norms and notions of 
morality.”). 
 289. Mark A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law 173 (2007). 
 290. See supra text accompanying notes 284–288. 
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point, imposing criminal liability to activity about which there is 
insufficient opprobrium begins to cost the legal system in legitimacy. 
Similarly, there is a similar cost when the legal system fails to impose 
criminal liability to conduct against which there is sufficiently strong 
opprobrium. 
This legitimacy cost might be understood in two ways. Tom Tyler 
has produced significant empirical support showing the importance of 
congruity between the normative values and legal prescription.291 People 
who agree with the law are more likely to obey the law. Where the law 
deviates too far from normative values, it does so at some cost to 
people’s willingness to obey the law. But there is also a strong procedural 
component to whether people view law as legitimate.292 Legitimacy is 
predicated on a view that the legal system is fair, neutral, respectful, and 
honest.293 Where the law functions in ways deemed inconsistent with 
these procedural values, it does so at a cost to its legitimacy.294 
Alternatively, the cost can be understood as a corollary of the 
internal aspect of rules. The internal point of view—that one has an 
obligation to obey the law simply because it is the law—need not be, and 
is not, adopted by all people subject to a law.295 Law has an internal 
aspect, but not all people subject to the law recognize that aspect. As a 
purely descriptive matter, the more the substance of the law deviates 
from a person’s normative views, the less likely the person is to recognize 
the law as an authority meriting compliance for its own sake. Where 
people subject to the law do not adopt the internal view—where they do 
not accept an obligation to comply with the law independent of any 
consequences associated with failure to do so—the law loses some 
efficacy. The law then becomes reliant entirely on force—the penalties 
for non-compliance—to generate compliance. 
Corporate immunity from criminal prosecution would come at a 
significant legitimacy cost. Failure to subject corporations to even the 
possibility of criminal prosecution—or a policy of immunity for 
corporations—would deviate too far from the perception that 
corporations can and should be blamed for certain wrongdoings. The 
 
 291. See Tyler, supra note 30, at 64 (“The most important normative influence on compliance with 
the law is the person’s assessment that following the law accords with his or her sense of right and 
wrong . . . .”). 
 292. See Tom R. Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law? The Findings of 
Psychological Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 661, 663 (2007) (“[P]eople are 
more interested in how fairly their case is handled than they are in whether they win . . . . [N]umerous 
studies conducted over the last several decades have consistently found this to be true.”). 
 293. Id. at 664; see also Tyler, supra note 30, at 163–65. 
 294. See Tyler, supra note 292, at 664; see also Tyler, supra note 30, at 163–65. 
 295. See supra note 253 and accompanying text. 
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legitimacy cost of this immunity is the strongest argument in favor of 
criminal liability for corporations as opposed to mere civil liability. 
Were corporations immune to criminal sanctions, criminal conduct 
that benefited the corporation would result in nothing more than a civil 
penalty. Civil penalties lack the expression of condemnation inherent in 
criminal penalties.296 The label matters. Even identical penalties in the 
civil and criminal arenas carry different messages. The criminal penalty 
expresses opprobrium. The civil penalty expresses the cost of doing 
business. A criminal penalty can carry felon status. A civil penalty is little 
more than a price tag.297 
The failure to impose criminal liability on corporations—where 
people morally condemn corporations qua corporations for criminal 
conduct—would expose the criminal justice system to accusations of 
favoritism and undermine its appearance of equal application of laws. It 
risks sending the signal that criminal conduct will be punished—except 
where it is committed by a corporation. 
In some instances, there will be justification for treating corporations 
and people differently. The distinction in capacity between corporations 
and natural persons may provide a reason to do so.298 But this raises an 
empirical issue: How much do people tend to discount corporate capacity 
to influence criminal conduct, and is that amount sufficient to justify 
fundamentally different treatment by the criminal justice system? Public 
reaction to corporate wrongdoing suggests the discount is not so great as 
to merit entirely distinct treatment. Indeed, Dan Kahan contends that 
“members of the public tend to experience greater moral indignation 
toward corporations than toward natural persons for the same crimes.”299 
 
 296. See supra text accompanying notes 260–264. 
 297. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. Legal Stud. 
609, 618–19 (1998) [hereinafter Kahan, Social Meaning] (“Criminal liability ‘sends the message’ that 
people matter more than profits and reaffirms the value of those who were sacrificed to ‘corporate 
greed.’ . . . [C]ivil damages seem to connote that society is ‘pricing’ corporate crime.”); see also Dan M. 
Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 591, 622 (1996) (“[I]f the offense was 
committed in the course of commercial activities, a fine is likely to be derided as merely the ‘cost of 
doing business.’”). 
 298. See supra notes 127–136 and accompanying text. 
 299. Kahan, Social Meaning, supra note 297, at 618 n.42 (citing Valerie P. Hans & M. David 
Ermann, Responses to Corporate Versus Individual Wrongdoing, 13 Law & Hum. Behav. 151, 158, 162 
(1989)) (emphasis added) ; see, e.g., Joann L. Miller et al., Felony Punishments: A Factorial Survey of 
Perceived Justice in Criminal Sentencing, 82 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 396, 412–14 (1991). This is a 
delicate point. If taken as a statement of normative value, it could become grounds for the same ridicule 
invited by proposing moral condemnation of inanimate objects. Given that corporations are distinguished 
from natural persons by having less capacity, it would seem odd to attribute greater blame to a 
corporation than to a natural person for the same crime. The explanation for this distinction may be that 
people are naturally less sympathetic to corporations than to natural persons. Or, it may be that with 
diminished capacity, corporations also merit diminished mercy. Erin Shelley presents an argument, 
supported by psychological literature, that harms caused by corporations are perceived as more 
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People blame corporations for criminal violations committed in the 
corporation’s name or for corporate benefit.300 The failure to criminally 
punish corporations for these wrongs would undermine public respect for 
the criminal justice system.301 It would represent a failure of procedural 
justice and a lack of neutrality,302 thus undermining the legitimacy of the 
legal system. It would also shift the substantive law away from the norm 
that corporations ought to be blamed when they cause criminal harm. 
Some have claimed that the reputational harm for a corporation 
found criminally liable is not greater than that for a corporation found 
civilly liable.303 If true, this would bring into question whether criminal 
liability really carries a unique or uniquely strong expression of 
condemnation. And the current enforcement environment suggests a 
 
significant by reason of the fact that they were caused by a corporation; this too could explain the 
heightened condemnation of corporations that cause harm compared to individuals who cause 
comparable harm. See Erin Shelley, Perceptual Harm and the Corporate Criminal, 81 U. Cin. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2022379. The reasons 
behind the distinction are beyond the scope of this Article. But, if taken merely as an accurate 
description, it becomes a fact for which any theory of corporate criminal liability must account.  
 300. This is merely a descriptive claim. Alschuler is quite critical of the tendency to blame 
inanimate objects, but he does not deny the tendency. See Two Ways to Think About Punishment of 
Corporations, 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1359, 1336 (2009). Perhaps this is a subset of what Mackie calls the 
paradox of retribution: “[O]n the one hand, a retributive principle of punishment cannot be explained 
or developed within a reasonable system of moral thought, while, on the other hand, such a principle 
cannot be eliminated from our moral thinking.” See Mackie, supra note 141. Mackie resolves the 
paradox by recognizing retributive tendencies as based in a specific type of emotion, which emotion is 
deeply ingrained, perhaps biologically mandated, and is subject to neither eradication nor rational 
explanation. So too with corporations: People blame them; it’s difficult to justify that blame, but it’s 
more problematic to ignore that blame. 
 301. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 453, 457 
(1997): 
The criminal law can have a second effect in gaining compliance with its commands. If it 
earns a reputation as a reliable statement of what the community, given sufficient 
information and time to reflect, would perceive as condemnable, people are more likely to 
defer to its commands as morally authoritative and as appropriate to follow in those 
borderline cases in which the propriety of certain conduct is unsettled or ambiguous in the 
mind of the actor. The importance of this role should not be underestimated; in a society 
with the complex interdependencies characteristic of ours, an apparently harmless action 
can have destructive consequences. When the action is criminalized by the legal system, one 
would want the citizen to ‘respect the law’ in such an instance even though he or she does 
not immediately intuit why that action is banned. Such deference will be facilitated if 
citizens are disposed to believe that the law is an accurate guide to appropriate prudential 
and moral behavior. 
 302. That is, if people do not perceive a material distinction between crime by corporations and crime 
by individuals, or a material distinction between punishing corporations and punishing individuals, the 
failure to punish corporations criminally will violate the neutrality principle. See Tyler, supra note 292, at 
664 (“Neutrality involves making decisions based upon consistently applied legal principles . . . .”). This is 
not to suggest that people would never perceive a material distinction between individual criminal actors 
and corporate criminal actors; it is enough that people will not always perceive such a distinction to justify 
the imposition of criminal liability on corporations in some cases. 
 303. See supra note 221. 
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factor that may be diluting the expressive aspect of criminal liability: The 
increased use304 of criminal law enforcement to secure civil resolutions305 
goes a long way toward blurring the lines between civil and criminal law. 
It would not be shocking if this blurring diminished the expressive aspect 
of criminal liability.306 
As a normative matter, the distinction ought to be maintained 
because it has social value.307 If the current practice of corporate criminal 
prosecutions has blurred the distinction between criminal and civil, this is 
reason to revisit the practice. Criminal sanctions generally do carry a 
distinctive expressive element, and they ought to do so. 
But it also seems premature to declare that the public no longer 
ever perceives a difference between criminal and civil liability for 
corporations. In cases of deeply unpopular harms possibly caused by 
organizations (for example, oil spills or the recent financial crisis), the 
imposition of mere civil penalties generates popular anger. By way of 
example, on April 16, 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) charged Goldman Sachs with “defrauding investors by 
misstating and omitting key facts about a financial product tied to 
subprime mortgages as the U.S. housing market was beginning to 
falter.”308 Within two business days, Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur sent 
a letter to Attorney General Eric Holder.309 In the letter, the 
Congresswoman noted that while the SEC had charged Goldman, the 
SEC’s power is limited to civil actions.310 She accordingly asked the 
Department of Justice to “open a case on this matter and investigate it 
with the full authority and power that your agency holds.”311 The letter 
declared: “If both global and domestic confidence in the integrity of the 
U.S. financial system is to be regained, there must be confidence that 
 
 304. See Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-10-110, Corporate Crime: DOJ Has Taken Steps to 
Better Track Its Use of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements, but Should Evaluate 
Effectiveness (2009) (measuring a marked increasing in the use of DPAs and NPAs in the 2000s). 
 305. See Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 159 (2008) (describing significant shifts in the 
pattern of criminal investigations of corporations that increasingly result in pre-indictment civil 
resolutions). 
 306. In fact, this is precisely the concern raised by Professor Coffee twenty years ago. See Coffee, 
supra note 242, at 1877. 
 307. See supra text accompanying notes 279–288. 
 308. See Press Release, Securities & Exchange Comm’n, SEC Charges Goldman Sachs with Fraud 
in Structuring and Marketing of CDO Tied to Subprime Mortgages (Apr. 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-59.htm. 
 309. See Eric Zimmerman, House Democrats Calling for Criminal Investigation of Goldman Sachs, 
The Hill (Apr. 21, 2010), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/93553-dems-push-for-
criminal-investigation-of-goldman-sachs. 
 310. See id. 
 311. Id. 
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criminal acts will be vigorously pursued and perpetrators punished.”312 
People do perceive a difference between civil liability and criminal 
liability for organizations, at least in some cases. 
There is, however, another reply to the objection that criminal 
liability no longer carries a distinctive stigma for corporations: The 
absence of a strong expressive element to the imposition of criminal 
liability does not necessarily entail the absence of a strong expressive 
element to corporate immunity from prosecution. Consider what is really 
on the table: Should the legal system ever hold corporations criminally 
liable? If the answer is no, corporations will be immune from criminal 
prosecution. Even were it the case that individual corporate convictions 
fail to carry the sort of expression of condemnation traditionally 
associated with criminal conviction, it does not follow that blanket 
immunity from criminal law would have little expressive value. The 
systemic shift from a world in which corporations are expressly forbidden 
from committing crimes (criminal liability) to one in which otherwise 
criminal conduct is merely priced for corporations (civil liability) would 
itself represent a significant expression. 
The expressive cost of corporate immunity is likely greater than the 
expressive value of corporate criminal liability. Immunizing corporations 
from criminal prosecution would undermine perceptions of the 
procedural fairness of our legal system and it would create a significant 
disparity between the values of the legal system and existing social 
norms. Corporate criminal liability is justified, because the alternative—
immunity—costs too much. 
D. Expressivism Is Justified Toward Corporations in a Way It Is 
Not Toward Natural Persons 
There is a problem with expressivism: It is particularly susceptible to 
Hart’s concern about law “treat[ing] men merely as alterable, 
predictable, curable, or manipulable things.”313 Imposing criminal liability 
merely on the basis of its expressive value very much threatens to treat 
people as means to an end. There would be a real reason to question the 
priorities of a legal system that treated a natural person’s life or liberty as 
means to achieve the end of societal expression. The life and liberty of 
natural persons should take precedence over goals of societal expression. 
 
 312. See Letter from Marcy Kaptur to Eric Holder (Apr. 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2010/04/20/859209/-Marcy-Kaptur-Demands-AG-Holder-Investigate-
Goldman-Sachs-Sign-the-Petition. To date, sixty one members of congress have co-signed the letter. 
See Standing up to Wall Street Greed, Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur, http://www.kaptur.house.gov/ 
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=637 (last visited Oct. 2, 2012). 
 313. Hart, supra note 147, at 183. 
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For this reason, purely expressivist justifications of punishment are 
correctly subject to strong challenge. 
The challenge, however, applies less in the context of corporate 
criminal liability for two simple reasons. First, there is no claim that 
expressivism is the sole or even primary justification for corporate 
criminal liability. Changing corporate conduct—deterrence in a broad 
sense—is the primary justification for corporate punishment. 
Expressivism is not intended to justify the imposition of punishment 
itself. It is offered as a justification for the imposition of criminal liability 
on corporations instead of mere civil liability. 
Second, to state the obvious, corporations are not natural persons.314 
As was addressed above,315 there is good reason to be less concerned 
about fairness to corporations than to natural persons. Whereas treating 
natural persons as a means to the end of expression is deeply troubling, 
treating corporations as means to the end of expression does not raise 
the same concerns. 
Conclusion 
Deterrence is and will remain the dominant purpose of imposing 
any sort of liability on corporations. Corporations can cause harm, and 
liability for certain harms can cause corporations to alter their behavior 
to cause less harm. That is really why we hold corporations liable. 
Deterrence, however, does not clearly justify criminal liability over 
civil liability. Corporate punishments are basically about money. And 
civil penalties can also produce money damages—probably more 
efficiently than criminal penalties. There are reputational effects 
affiliated with criminal sanctions that may not be replicated by civil 
sanctions. However, reputational impacts are unpredictable, and there is 
little reason to believe they align with the amount of desired deterrence 
in any case. 
But criminal liability for corporations remains an important aspect 
of our legal system. Criminal liability is justified over mere civil liability 
because of its expressive value. That expressive value is most clear where 
we consider the alternative: corporate immunity. Immunizing 
corporations from criminal prosecution would serve as a statement that 
the legal system was pricing corporate crime and differentiating between 
powerful corporations and mere persons. While the differentiation 
between corporations and persons may be justifiable philosophically, it 
deviates too far from the fact that people do blame corporations when 
they commit crimes. Isolating corporations from this blame through 
 
 314. See supra note 103. 
 315. See supra text accompanying notes 157–171. 
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immunity from criminal prosecution would create legitimacy costs. 
People would lose respect for a legal system that expressed values so 
contrary to their own. 
Understood in this way, the purpose of corporate criminal liability is 
deterrence and maintaining expressive consistency. Maintaining 
expressive consistency is the distinctive reason to impose criminal, as 
opposed to mere civil, liability on corporations. As such, there is work to 
be done. The practice of corporate criminal liability is in some disrepair. 
Corporations are subject to regulation by prosecutors through the threat 
of debilitating criminal sanctions.316 The doctrine of respondeat superior, 
coupled with the severity of criminal sanctions, leaves corporations often 
unable to defend themselves in any but the most gentle manner.317 A new 
understanding of the purpose of criminal liability for corporations calls 
for a re-examination of the practice of criminal liability for corporations 
to determine how best to align the practice with the purpose. If criminal 
liability exists for its expressive value, criminal prosecutions of 
corporations should be reconsidered in light of their expressive value. 
The expression inherent in no-fault civil settlements under threat of 
indictment is weak, and arguably harmful. Such resolutions carry the 
expressive downsides of criminal immunity (corporate crime is priced; 
corporations are treated differently than persons in a way not clearly 
justified) and the additional expressive cost of appearing unprincipled 
(corporations are compelled to pay fines under threat of indictment). If 
the expressive value of criminal liability matters, prosecutions should 
proceed with some consideration for the expressive costs and benefits 
affiliated with the action. 
Criminal liability is not going to attach to every corporate wrong, 
nor should it. Corporate indictments can have severe consequences for 
innocent parties. The increased use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements 
and Non-Prosecution Agreements stems from this recognition. 
Maintaining the expressive value of criminal prosecutions does not mean 
abandoning such tools. It means structuring a system of liability, 
prosecutorial discretion, and criminal penalties that express clear 
condemnation when it is appropriate to do so. Indeed, the result of 
reassessing the practice of criminally prosecuting corporations in light of 
its expressive value may well be to decrease the sum total of criminal 
sanctions against corporations. Reform is needed, but it should be reform 
that bolsters the expressive value of corporate criminal liability. And it 
should be reform that recognizes the expressive cost of immunity. 
 
 316. See Spivak & Raman, supra note 305. 
 317. Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 271, 277–
81 (2008). 
